

JPRS-TAC-87-031

7 MAY 1987

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPANESE OFFICIAL TO VISIT U.S. FOR SDI TALKS

OW101313 Tokyo KYODO in English 1309 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Tokyo, April 10 KYODO -- Japan will send an official to Washington Sunday to hold informed talks with U.S. Defense Department officials on Japan's participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), government sources said Friday.

The sources said the Foreign Ministry will dispatch Makoto Watanabe, councillor for its North American Bureau, to meet Pentagon officials to discuss concrete details of Japan's participation in the U.S. anti-ballistic defense program. The Japanese Government has decided to join in the research phase of the SDI.

The talks, which Japan sees as a final adjustment on the issue with the United States before the holding of a formal meeting, will center on assuring the rights of the Japanese firms involved to utilize the results of the space defense research, the sources said. Protection of the secrecy of the results and publication of the final Japan-U.S. SDI Agreement will be on the agenda, they added.

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CSO: 5260/087

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

NAKASONE TO DISCUSS TRADE, ARMS CONTROL IN U.S.

OW111111 Tokyo KYODO in English 1057 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Text] Tokyo, April 11 KYODO -- Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone will leave for Washington later this month on a mission to ease U.S.-Japanese economic tensions and pave the way for stronger bilateral political ties.

His journey comes at a time when relations between the two countries are strained by an acute dispute over semiconductor trade.

The forthcoming trip will probably be his last official visit to the United States as his unprecedented, one-year extended tenure as prime minister expires in October.

Government officials say his summit talks with President Ronald Reagan will focus on three subjects -- bilateral cooperation leading toward the Venice summit, strengthening of political cooperation and easing the current economic frictions.

Nakasone hopes to use their personal "Ron-Yasu" friendship to strengthen political ties between the two countries, the officials said.

He will appeal to Reagan for the early realization of an East-West summit to promote disarmament, they said.

Nakasone will reiterate Japan's demand that mutual nuclear arms reductions include the removal of Soviet SS-20 missiles from Asia, officials said.

The prime minister will explain Japan's defense policy calling for the strengthening of security capabilities while maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the officials said.

He will reiterate Japan's decision to participate in research on Reagans Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), they said.

The officials said Nakasone hopes the groundwork for a solution to the current economic friction will be laid by former Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, who will visit Washington April 19 as his special envoy.

The bilateral tension stems from the dispute over semiconductor trade which has led Washington to take retaliatory action against Japan and the U.S. demand that Japan open its market to U.S. exports to reduce its lopsided trade imbalance.

Abe is expected to tell U.S. officials that Japan will ease import controls on farm products, procure U.S. supercomputers and offer U.S. and other companies wider access to the Kansai Airport project and the telecommunications market, the officials said.

Nakasone will also discuss with Reagan the recent monetary uncertainty which has caused the Japanese yen to appreciate sharply against the U.S. dollar.

He will stress the importance of monetary stability for the revitalization of the world economy and pledge Japan's efforts to stimulate its domestic economy, the officials said.

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CSO: 5260/088

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

XINHUA ON REAGAN ARMS PROPOSAL 'POLICY SHIFT'

OW101858 Beijing XINHUA in English 1838 GMT 10 Apr 87

["Reagan Retreats From Previous Arms Control Proposals"--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, April 10 (XINHUA) — U.S. President Ronald Reagan, in a major policy shift on arms control, has decided to reduce from ten to five years during which the United States would not withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) or deploy its "Star Wars" system, according to local press reports today.

In a secret national security decision directive that Reagan signed after consultations with his senior White House aides Wednesday, the President instructed Secretary of State George Shultz to tell his Soviet counterpart next week that the United States is now willing to abide by the ABM Treaty constraints on SDI for five years from the point that a new arms-reduction treaty takes effect.

This is seen here as a step backward from the previous proposal Reagan made to Moscow in Iceland last October that the United States would abide by the ABM Treaty until at least 1996.

Reagan has also authorized Shultz to inform the Soviets that his proposed 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons be carried out over a period of seven years instead of five as was discussed at the Iceland summit.

Shultz will fly to Moscow for discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and possibly Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, that are generally expected to be focused on arms control, especially on the elimination of intermediate nuclear force (INF) missiles in Europe.

But U.S. Arms Control Agency Director Kenneth Adelman told reporters yesterday that Shultz will put the emphasis of the discussions on reducing strategic nuclear weapons because "that is the main interest we have in the field of arms control."

While INF negotiations have made some progress since the Soviet Union delinked the issue from space weapons at the end of February, the other two sets of talks on strategic arms and space-based missile defenses are deadlocked as the Soviets still insist on linking them.

It is believed here that the new shift in Reagan's position will virtually doom any chance during his presidency of reaching a U.S.-Soviet agreement on missile defense or strategic arms reductions, which Moscow insists must be tied to strict SDI

constraints. Reports said Reagan has also rejected a new Soviet compromise offer on partial nuclear testing limitations.

The Soviet Union was reportedly no longer insisting on an immediate comprehensive nuclear test ban and offered instead to concentrate on new partial limits on nuclear explosions.

But Reagan has instructed Shultz that there should be no further talks on testing until the Soviet Union agreed to new monitoring measures for two existing but unratified treaties -- the threshold test ban treaty of 1974 and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty of 1976. On the INF issue, Shultz would carry no new proposals to Moscow but would rather seek to clarify the Soviet position on short-range missiles which constituted a stumbling block to an agreement on medium-range missiles, the reports said.

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CSO: 5200/4080

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: U.S. APPROACH TO INF TALKS 'DISTURBING'

PM081007 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 14, 3-9 Apr 87 (Signed to Press 2 Apr 87) p 1

[Editorial: "For a Nuclear-Free European Home"]

[Excerpts] After the Soviet Union, guided by awareness of its special responsibility to the world, proposed singling out the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the package of interconnected questions of nuclear disarmament and concluding a separate agreement on it with the United States without delay, a situation unique in recent decades from both the military and the political viewpoints has taken shape on the European continent. Possibilities have been opened up for the signing of an agreement which, for the first time in postwar history, would lead to the disappearance of some weapons from the face of Europe -- in this instance an entire class of nuclear missiles. It is already clear that the agreement would provide for the elimination of the American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles today stationed in the FRG, Britain, Italy, and Belgium and the Soviet medium-range missiles stationed in the European part of the USSR. This would be a timely step for the continent where the concentration of armed forces and arms is today 20 times greater than the average for the world. [passage omitted]

With Old Baggage [subhead]

For more than a month there has been unabating discussion in the pages of the press, at meetings and sessions at various levels, and in Western countries' government cabinets, prompted by the Soviet Union's bold step toward its partners on the question of medium-range missiles. Much that is sober and sensible is being said. It has been given a positive assessment, on the whole, by U.S. President R. Reagan and the leaders of a number of West European states.

Account must be taken here of the fact that the Soviet proposal approximates to a considerable degree the so-called "zero option" advanced by the United States and its NATO allies 6 years ago. Rejecting it outright, as has happened frequently with Soviet initiatives in the past, would mean simply spiting oneself.

This is what is disturbing about this discussion -- the seeking out of arguments which could be used as a cover for halting the talks on medium-range missiles. Not to mention the fact that it is accompanied by actions which are in no way conducive to the atmosphere at the talks. For example, the end of the latest round of Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on medium-range missiles coincided with the Pentagon's new test launch of Pershing-2's from Cape Canaveral in Florida, moreover by servicemen of the very

artillery brigade which maintains these missiles in the FRG. The stationing of American cruise missiles which has begun at a second U.S. air base in the British Isles -- Molesworth -- could also be mentioned. These are the very ones whose elimination is being discussed at the talks. Are they being stationed in order to be destroyed?

But more important questions arise on analyzing the reasoning and arguments of opponents of nuclear disarmament in Europe. What the Soviet Union has in mind in proposing to start talks on operational and tactical missiles is their reduction and total elimination. Washington, by all accounts, is aiming for an agreement which would give it the green light to upgrade shorter-range missiles -- which it would like to carry out by reequipping Pershing-2 missiles and detaching their second stage.

In moving toward the West, the Soviet Union has extracted the problem of medium-range missiles from the "Reykjavik package" precisely in order to solve it separately, without any hindrance. But those who urged us to do this are now themselves trying to offer us a "package" including all kinds of nuclear missiles in Europe, thereby, of course, complicating the path to an accord.

A call to link the reaching of an agreement on missiles to totally unrelated questions is even heard. For example, the White House is being urged not to sign an agreement until the Soviet Union... withdraws its troops from Afghanistan. A different kind of appeal is issuing from Britain: First the Soviet Union must be made to respect human rights and, in particular, to change its emigration policy. In its issue published on the eve of M. Thatcher's visit to the USSR; THE SUNDAY TIMES puts the question bluntly: "What price agreement on medium-range missiles if a British bride is barred from being with her Ukrainian husband?"

The next few weeks will show whether NATO really wants to remove from European soil an entire class of nuclear weapons, as the people expect.

Intensive consultations and discussions are taking place in Washington and in European capitals. It is still too early to sum up the final results on this specific problem. Although in the wider context of what our European home is to be like -- nuclear-free or nuclear -- there are serious differences in the positions, which were manifested, in particular, during M. Thatcher's visit to us. It is impossible to bridge the existing gulf at a stroke. But reaching an agreement on medium-range missiles could narrow this gulf.

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CSO: 5200/1421

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET GENERAL ON 'TACTICAL' CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND INF OFFER

PM080827 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Apr 87 p 10

[Undated interview with Major General Yuriy Lebedev by Harald Hamrin: "Tactics Behind the 'Missile Package'"]

[Text] Moscow -- There were purely tactical considerations behind the Soviet negotiating package which was put forward at the Reykjavik summit in October of last year. There is no "organic link" between medium-range missiles on the one hand and the U.S. space defense plans on the other.

That was why it was possible a few months later -- in Mikhail Gorbachev's 28 February initiative -- for the Soviet Union to "lift out" the medium-range missiles from the "package" and thus open the way for an agreement freeing Europe from all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles.

This surprising revelation was made by a high-ranking Soviet officer, Major General Yuriy Lebedev, in an interview with DAGENS NYHETER's correspondent.

Gen Lebedev did not give any further explanation of what these tactical considerations were, but simply said that they were to do with "diplomatic tactics." However, in a different context he said that the "contours of an agreement" on medium-range missiles were already clear in the talks between President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik.

"The only thing which prevented an agreement at that time was the inclusion of this issue in a general bloc of proposals from the Soviet side, that is, the so-called Soviet package," Lebedev said.

A possible explanation of the "tactics" behind the Soviet decision to link the question of medium-range missiles with the issue of strategic nuclear arms and the U.S. SDI program in one and the same "package" was hinted at as long ago as late November of last year.

In an interview with DAGENS NYHETER well-known Soviet foreign affairs commentator Aleksandr Bovin of IZVESTIYA explained -- as Gen Lebedev did -- that the "package" related to tactics. The aim, Bovin said, was to direct the attention of world opinion to SDI as the element in U.S. policy which is an obstacle to all agreements in the field of arms control.

"When the 'package' has done this job it will be dissolved," Bovin predicted even then.

Gen Lebedev has a central role in the formulation of Soviet policy in the field of arms control. He is deputy to Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, who is the head of the Soviet General Staff section responsible for treaties and negotiations.

In the interview with DAGENS NYHETER Lebedev said that the Soviet decision of 28 February to "lift out" the medium-range missiles in Europe from the "Reykjavik package" was a decisive step.

"Before that we had been saying that that was impossible," he said. "It is clear that the medium-range missiles in the package did have a link with strategic nuclear arms and with SDI. But it was not an organic link."

"It is not possible to artificially tear up this link," he said. "That has to be understood. That is why we will remain firm that cuts in strategic arms are possible only under strict adherence to the ABM Treaty in its narrow interpretation."

While admitting that a large measure of tactics was part of the "Reykjavik package," Lebedev stressed, however, that the Soviet decision on the "disengagement" of medium-range missiles was not easy.

"As far as Europe is concerned we have kept the British and French nuclear arms out of it," he said. "And for the time being we have also kept out the question of the U.S. Forward Based Systems (FBS)."

FBS refers to the U.S. "forward based" nuclear arms in the form of nuclear-armed aircraft in Europe, as well as nuclear-capable carrier-based aircraft. Lebedev's stress on the fact that "for the time being" the Soviet Union has kept FBS out of the discussions contains a hint that the issue could be raised if in the discussions in the coming weeks and months the United States and NATO remain firm on positions which in the Soviet view make an agreement more difficult.

According to Lebedev it is already clear that the United States and some Western states have begun to follow such a line -- and doing so have thrown gravel into the negotiating machinery.

"Unfortunately the most recent round of talks (in Geneva) showed that the U.S. side is seeking to make a solution to the issue (of the medium-range missiles) more difficult," he said, pointing in this context to three factors:

As soon as the Soviet Union has lifted the medium-range missiles out of its "package" and agreed to separate negotiations on them, the West created its own "package." This now includes missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km (where the Soviet Union has a great superiority) as well as the medium-range missiles. Lebedev said that the Soviet Union is willing to negotiate the destruction of these short-range missiles too, but this is something that should happen in separate negotiations. In the event of an agreement on medium-range missiles only the Soviet Union's SS-12 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia will be withdrawn automatically and without negotiations, he said, since they were deployed there in response to the U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles.

Lebedev also criticized the United States for seeking to avoid the physical destruction of the Pershing-2 missiles. In the event of an agreement these could be "reequipped" so that they would have a shorter range (less than 1,000 km). But if it is possible today to give them a shorter range by removing a rocket stage, it is just as easy to give them back a longer range tomorrow, he said. For the same reason the U.S. idea that the nuclear-armed cruise missiles would be equipped with conventional warheads is just as unacceptable to the Soviet Union. In addition, the question of verification would also be made much more complicated.

In other respects too the United States has complicated the question of verification. Thus, according to Lebedev, the U.S. side takes the view that there can only be Soviet inspection of state-owned companies manufacturing missiles and components. According to the United States, private companies in the country are protected against such inspection. Lebedev said that he did not want to give the United States advice about how this problem should be solved -- it is an internal question for them -- but it must be solved in some way.

To summarize Gen Lebedev said that "all difficulties can be solved; it is merely the political will that is needed." It ought to be possible to completely negotiate an agreement on medium-range missiles within 6 months. The problem at present is that the United States is trying to "frighten people off with all the difficulties." U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz' visit to Moscow 13-16 April could be crucial to the prospects for the negotiations.

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CSO: 5200/1421

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S INF OFFER ENTAILS 'A CERTAIN RISK'

PM071329 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 4 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by political observer Vladimir Katin: "Europe: Moment of Truth" under the rubric "View of Events"]

[Text] The urgency and importance of the Soviet proposal on medium range missiles is so obvious that no West European leader has openly said "no" to it. Moreover, our initiative has even been welcomed in the NATO capitals. My file contains a whole collection of statements on this score by British, French, West German, Belgian, and other political leaders in the Old World. However, the value and sincerity of any declarations is verified, as we know, by practical action. There is a rule in diplomacy: You have to understand what your opposite number is thinking when he is talking. Yes, in Western Europe seemingly all or nearly all the leaders are talking about the expediency of eliminating medium-range missiles. Yet nonetheless...

During the recent meeting and talk in the Kremlin between M.S. Gorbachev and British Prime Minister M. Thatcher this question was thoroughly discussed in detail. The Soviet leader stated quite frankly: As soon as something in the way of a positive solution begins to appear, activity in Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn is immediately aimed at seeking pretexts for slowing the process by citing Soviet 'superiority.' "And now," he noted, "we can see attempts being made to scuttle the talks on medium-range missiles. In separating the medium-range missile problem from the overall 'package' we were counting on British and French support. But where is that support?"

That is a substantial question. It is the moment of truth for Europe, when all countries must jointly work to finally produce progress on the problem of ridding the continent of nuclear death. This cannot be done with mere good intentions. Yet we can see how the initiative -- recognized by everyone as useful -- is accumulating a whole package of conditions and demands imposed on the Soviet Union. The NATO countries are quietly dismounting from their favorite hobby horse, the "zero option", which they themselves proposed, under which there would be no U.S. or Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Remember that we are talking about 380 U.S. missiles and 355 Soviet missiles to be eliminated. Now that things have reached the point where specific practical actions are being taken, it seems that the West European capitals --paradoxical as it may seem -- have gotten scared: They had to persuade and cajole their publics so much about the U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, and now they will have to part with them...

Well, the capacity for suspicion is a naturale one. Let us put the question this way: Did these U.S. Missiles add to the West European countries' security?

The pro forma excuse for NATO's 1979 decision to site around 600 U.S. medium-range missiles was the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles to replace the obsolete SS-4's and SS-5's. There is every justification for considering this a purely formal pretext. After all, the replacement of the Soviet missiles more than halved the total yield of their nuclear charges! So the strategic situation in Europe had not changed and there was no additional threat to West Europeans. Incidentally, B. Rogers, supreme commander, NATO Armed Forces, Europe, very frankly admitted in 1983 that the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles would have appeared on European soil even if there had been no SS-20 missiles.

There are also other well-known facts that prove that it was not actually the Soviet SS-20 missiles that were the cause of NATO's so-called "arms upgrading." It transpires that the first contracts for the development of Pershing-2 missiles were concluded back in 1969 and the first contracts for cruise missiles were concluded in the early seventies. Then in 1975, when there was not even any trace of the Soviet SS-20 missiles, the NATO leadership decided to modernize its nuclear potential. All these facts demonstrate unambiguously the true U.S. and NATO bloc intention -- to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.

Europe will only have really reliable security when it is cleared of nuclear explosives, and stops being figures in U.S. strategists' plans as a military theater. There is now an opportunity to create such a Europe. "The next few weeks will show," M.S. Gorbachev said at the dinner in honor of the British prime minister, "whether NATO really wants to clear a whole class of nuclear weapons from European soil, as the peoples expect. Or whether it is again seeking the best way to cover up its desire to retain and even increase the number of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe or replace them with something newer."

It seems that this is precisely what currently concerns certain politicians in the West and the press that reflects their interests, painting pictures of a "Soviet threat," a weakened Europe, and even, you see...a defenseless Europe in the face of the Russians, and so forth. A veritable campaign is essentially already under way to sow doubt among West Europeans and to stall and delay the conclusion of an agreement.

You do not need a telescope to see the impressive arsenal of the U.S. forward-based facilities sited near Soviet borders, their sea-based forces, or the nuclear forces of Britain and France themselves, which are being built up and improved. However, in solving the problem of medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union is not touching or restricting this mountain of arms. There is, of course, a certain risk in that. But our country is taking that risk for the sake of starting the process of building a nuclear-free Europe.

In principle, it is not a question of weighing on an apothecary's scales who has what kinds of weapons. The main thing is that military parity exists in Europe as a whole. However, even if someone doubts that, there is a good way to dispel such doubts. Our country and the other Warsaw pact countries have long proposed simultaneously disbanding the military-political alliances and, figuratively speaking, laying trails of confidence and cooperation where there were bases and trenches. What is dangerous about that, and where, one wonders, is the trickery? But no, the NATO countries do not agree to this, implying that they are morally unprepared for such resolute action. Moscow, however, continues to seek and propose phased reductions in armed forces and conventional arms. A detailed program for cutting a million men from both sides will soon have been on the table of the NATO governments and NATO headquarters for almost a

year. Incidentally, simultaneous reductions in nuclear arms of shorter range than medium-range missiles -- up to 1,000 km -- have also been proposed. So there is no shortage of ideas on this score. The whole problem is that there has not yet been any response from NATO. But we expect one.

While in the Soviet Union this week, the British head of government put her trust in nuclear weapons and extolled the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence." These views are shared by NATO and by the leadership of the overwhelming majority of West European countries. We in the Soviet Union reject this concept. Our logic is easy to understand: By refusing to use nuclear weapons first, the USSR will never use them against those countries which do not have any nuclear weapons on their own territory. That is our unswerving principle, reflecting new political thinking. Old thinking favoring armed force as a means of achieving political ends led to two world bloodbaths. It engendered a "cold war" and the present extremely dangerous situation and led the world to the brink of unpredictable consequences.

Our unilateral moratorium, the program for a nuclear-free world, the Reykjavik initiative, the Moscow forum "for a Nuclear-Free World for the Survival of Humanity," and now the proposal to resolve the question of medium-range missiles in Europe are manifestations of new thinking. An agreement would be not only of great military-political importance but would also change the situation psychologically. After all, hitherto everyone has only been amassing arms, building bases and hideouts, siting missiles, and stoking fear. However, Europe's genuine security should be ensured not by bases, missiles, or retaliatory measures, but by radical reductions in nuclear arms and their complete destruction. Hope for such a nuclear-free Europe was opened up this spring by the Soviet idea of eliminating medium-range missiles. The main thing now is to promote this process and allow it to conclude triumphantly to the benefit of all Europe and all mankind.

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CSO: 5200/1403

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S KARPOV ON 'STUMBLING BLOCK' TO INF ACCORD

PM081011 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 14, 5 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Simonov: "Do Americans Know How To Count Money?" under the rubric "The World on My Personal Computer"]

[Text] It is about eight years since I last lectured at Moscow's Polytechnical Museum. After an hour at the rostrum last Wednesday, I came to the conclusion that today's audience resembles that of eight years ago as much as Burda Moden do the garments sold at GUM (the State Department Store).

In the late 70s, as an international analyst I was snowed under with questions about our home affairs. "Why should you focus so much on world imperialism? You'd do better tell us what's happening in this country!"

Today, this information hunger is satisfied by the press and television. At the same time, people feel it in their bones that a historic breakthrough is about to be achieved in international affairs. The nuclear-free age seems to be within easy reach, at an arm's length, so to speak, although it must take two arms - those of the Soviet and American leaders - to sign the treaty on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

The notes I received from my audience at the Polytechnical Museum all focussed on that issue. It was an avalanche of notes, whose authors, for the most part, strove to understand why the United States treats its own "zero option" as a mother disowning her own baby. "Why should we be surprised about it, though, one of the notes written on a piece of checkered paper read, "seeing that the Pershings are already deployed and Americans are very good at counting their money?"

After returning from the public lecture, I rang up Viktor Karpov, the Chief of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Department in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who took the trouble to give MN the following exclusive interview.

[MN] "What happened in Geneva before the Soviet and American negotiators adjourned till April 23? What are the results of the round recently finished? Have you begun wording the future treaty?"

[Karpov] "What matters is not so much whether or not the sides have got down to work, as what their positions are. Many serious obstacles have remained in this area. The stumbling-block lying on the road to successful negotiations is so big that we cannot just go round it. We must get rid of it. Otherwise it may happen that while formally

signing the medium-range missiles elimination agreement, the United States will preserve the same missiles under a changed name. Instead of eliminating them, Americans are trying to transfer them to another category and so keep them. Of course, this is not the variant that can promote our cause.

"By 'another category' I mean the proposed conversion of the Pershing-2 missiles into Pershing-1Bs and keeping them in Europe as battlefield-tactical weapons. As a matter of fact, this leaves the US military a chance of easily reconvertng them back into Pershing-2s, because Pershing-1Bs is nothing but the first stage of the Pershing-2s. The second stage can be delivered and mounted in its original place at a very short notice. What sort of disarmament is this? We propose to scrap all medium-range missiles. Americans do not intend to eliminate cruise missiles either. All they are prepared to do is to make them sea-based."

[MN] "What about the verification issue? What does the United States propose in this area?"

[Karpov] "They don't seem to be seriously interested in verification. All they want to do is talk about it. If we analyze their position closely, we can see that far from all US bases in Europe will be subject to control. Therefore, the question of blocking every channel for getting round the treaty's obligations is all important."

[MN] "The Americans allege that the Soviet side has departed from the Reykjavik accord to discuss medium-range missiles together with the battle-field-tactical weapons. Is this true?"

[Karpov] "As a matter of fact, we have never refused to discuss these issues. But we have consistently argued against shifting medium-range missiles from one 'package' to another. It is the shifting that we object to. As to whether or not the problem of battlefield-tactical weapons should be resolved, there can be no question about it. We are prepared to continue negotiating with the American side to reduce and eventually eliminate these weapons. The artificial linkage is apparently designed to hinder a medium-range missile agreement."

As I rang off, the note I received at the Polytechnical Museum came to mind again. Of course, Americans know how to count money. Those belonging to the military-industrial complex believe medium-range missiles to be a sure investment, and are in no hurry to get rid of them.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY 7 APRIL PRESS BRIEFING

Hopes for Shultz Talks

LD072130 Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] The American state secretary, George Shultz, is to arrive in the Soviet Union on Monday the 13th. In a comment on the talks to be held in the Soviet capital, a spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry, Gennadiy Gerasimov, said the Soviet Union was scrupulously preparing for them. We hope, said the Soviet official, that the Shultz visit will bear positive fruit.

FRG's Genscher Interview on INF

LD071524 Moscow TASS in English 1453 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 7 TASS — Attention has been drawn in the Soviet Union to the interview of the FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher who declared in favour of an agreement on medium-range missiles, said Gennadiy Gerasimov, a representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry, today.

The keynote of the FRG foreign minister's interview was that conclusion of such an agreement would fully accord with NATO's aims which were earlier formulated in its "dual-track decision." Having taken that decision, the minister recalled, they stated in the West that "additional armament" might become unnecessary if Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles are removed.

It should be added to the minister's words that there is now such an opportunity, said Gennadiy Gerasimov at a briefing at the Foreign Ministry's Press Centre. The Soviet Union is ready to remove from Europe its medium-range nuclear systems. It is now for the West to have its say.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher said that his country was interested to see the USSR and USA to take obligations concerning subsequent negotiations on operational-tactical missiles and on questions pertaining to the correlation of forces in the sphere of conventional armaments. It is clear from his pronouncements that he was against plans of conversion of Pershing-2 missiles deployed on the FRG's territory, thereby declining the idea of NATO's new "additional armament," this time with operational-tactical missiles.

We view Hans-Dietrich Genscher's statement as the desire of the FRG Government to further "the zero option" on medium-range missiles, said the representative of the

Foreign Ministry of the USSR. It is also essential that the minister's considerations on ways of reaching this goal are largely in tune with our notions on how Europe could be rid of the nuclear weapons' burden. It is to be hoped that in the FRG, and in the West as a whole, they would not confine themselves to words only, but would take concrete constructive steps in line with the Europeans' aspirations, stressed the representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

No Change in Nuclear Blasts

LD071521 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1426 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, 7 Apr (TASS) -- THE NEW YORK TIMES reported today that the USSR has allegedly "put aside" its demands for a complete halt to all nuclear tests, (leaving it, it is true, as an ultimate goal) and has instead proposed that the U.S. side come to an agreement on limiting the number and capacity of nuclear explosions, USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said. Speaking here today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists, he pointed out that this report is being put forward as a change in the USSR's position.

In this regard I should like to recall that the USSR's decision to end its unilateral moratorium on any nuclear blasts is a forced responsive measure dictated exclusively by the interests of USSR security and provoked by the present U.S. Administration's reluctance to respond positively to the USSR's appeal for it to join its peace initiative, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said. The USSR's resumption of nuclear blasts does not mean that it has given up the resolute struggle for a complete end to them.

The USSR remains a convinced supporter of the complete termination of all nuclear tests as a most important initial measure in achieving the main goal -- halting the nuclear arms race, and the subsequent total elimination of nuclear arms. As before, the USSR will strive energetically to achieve that goal.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA WELCOMES INF HOST COUNTRIES' APPEAL

PM091055 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kharlanov dispatch: "European Crossroads"]

[Text] Brussels -- Belgium is often described as the "crossroads of Europe." A few days ago it reaffirmed its active role in the solution of all-European [obshcheyevropeyskiy] matters: Leaders of the foreign policy departments of the 12 "Common Market" countries met in the Belgian city of Turnhout. In the course of the meeting the foreign ministers of the FRG, Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, which originally agreed to the stationing of U.S. medium-range missiles on their territories, spoke in favor of the elimination of this type of arms from the continent of Europe.

...When the U.S. command concluded a contract with the Belgians for the construction of a special settlement in Florennes, where 16 cruise missiles are stationed, some journalists advised the parties to the contract to spit over their left shoulders: The political situation in Europe could develop in such a way as to leave the houses empty or only half-built.

When I reminded Jan Mient Faber, one of the leaders of the Netherlands antimissile movement and secretary of the churches' peace council, of this episode, he burst out laughing: "Without any prior arrangement with the Belgians, we also asked our government under no circumstances to start construction work on the Woensdrecht base where, according to the NATO plan, 48 U.S. cruise missiles are due to be stationed in 1988. We launched a boycott campaign against firms taking part in the construction work. The point is not that this money could end up being wasted. The construction sites in Woensdrecht and Florennes are an obvious challenge by those circles which would like to perpetuate the presence of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe."

At the time Washington and NATO literally twisted the arms of the Netherlands and Belgian Governments to force acceptance of the decision to station cruise missiles on their territories. This was sharply opposed from the very beginning by the public and by influential political circles in these countries. Since then, the struggle against cruise missiles in these countries has not abated.

Both the public and official circles in the Netherlands and Belgium have responded most favorably to the Soviet proposals for the elimination of medium-range nuclear missile weapons in Europe.

L. Van Geyt, president of the Belgian Communist Party, declared that matters should go further than just positive evaluations of the Soviet proposals. Belgium, together with other small and medium countries in Europe, must augment the efforts to achieve the withdrawal of Pershing, cruise, and SS-20 missiles from the continent of Europe. The task must be set of ridding Europe of all nuclear and chemical weapons and establishing an equilibrium of forces in the conventional arms sphere at the lowest possible level.

Jan Mient Faber believes that the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe would be an important step toward reducing military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and giving a new impetus to the movement for freeing Europe from other weapons, both nuclear and chemical, creating nuclear-free zones, and reducing conventional arms.

Leaders of Belgium's main political parties, including the belonging to those government coalition, have spoken in support of the Soviet proposals. K. Van Miert, president of the Socialist Party (Flemish-speaking), declared that the withdrawal of cruise missiles from Belgian territory would be important for it, and that this chance must not be missed. For her part, A.M. Neyts-Uyttebroeck, president of the Flemish Party for Freedom and Progress, believes that the West European countries and the United States must take advantage of the opportunities available now.

A Council of Ministers session in Brussels confirmed Belgium's stance regarding the Soviet proposals. Prime Minister W. Martens spoke in favor of Soviet-U.S. talks on medium-range missiles with a view to their complete elimination on the European continent. "We will uphold our position, he noted, "before our NATO allies and primarily the United States."

Belgian Foreign Minister L. Tindemans described the Soviet proposals as an important and positive measure. "After Reykjavik," he said, "some West European circles insisted on tying up medium-range missiles, tactical missiles, and conventional and chemical weapons in one single package. I believe that such a synthesis of problems would render the talks endless and would not produce any solution."

One of the squares in the center of Brussels is called "Crossroads of Europe." Belgians love to emphasize that their country plays host to the 'Common Market' leadership organs and NATO's political and military headquarters. Representatives of Belgian left-wing parties in the European Parliament have repeatedly made the point that the EEC must finally elaborate its own stance on key problems of disarmament. They were among the initiators of a resolution, adopted by the European Parliament in Strasbourg, which supported the Soviet Union's proposals aimed at the elimination of medium-range nuclear missile weapons in Europe.

The resolution was introduced by a group of socialists and social democrat. The vote was: 153 European Parliament deputies "for," 136 "against," and 1 abstention. EEC Commission President Jacques Delors proposed, on the basis of this resolution, that an extraordinary session of the EEC Council of Ministers be convened to elaborate a "joint reply" to the Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles and to step up cooperation among EEC countries in the sphere of foreign policy and security problems.

The European Parliament also recommended that the EEC Council of Ministers convene a special session with a view to elaborating a common stance to promote the achievement of a USSR-U.S. accord on medium-range missiles.

As for the NATO central institutions, events in the last few days testify that there have been no positive changes so far. A peculiar division of labor has prevailed for a long time now between NATO politicians and military. More often than not, politicians are cautious in their evaluations of major world events, pretending that they exert no pressure on the governments of North Atlantic bloc states. On the other hand, the generals as a rule do not mince their words, making no secret of the fact that they would like to have the last say on military-strategy problems and to reserve the right to make the decisions.

As soon as the Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles were published, journalists working in Brussels followed their natural inclination and attempted to find out how they would be treated by NATO organs. It was, after all, the NATO Council which in 1979 adopted the so-called "two-track solution," providing for the siting of U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Europe. In 1981 the U.S. NATO allies jointly approved Reagan's "zero option" on medium-range missiles in Europe. Furthermore, it was the NATO organs which, right after Reykjavik, launched a counteroffensive against the idea of ridding the continent of "Euromissiles." It was first launched by West German General H. J. Mack, NATO deputy Supreme Allied Commander B. Rogers himself and other high-ranking military officers.

The reply I got at the NATO political headquarters press office to a question about attitudes to the Soviet proposals was that they could add nothing to the statement by NATO Security General Lord Carrington, who assessed them as "a substantial step forward."

But when I attempted to interview U.S. General B. Rogers, NATO supreme allied commander, Europe, officers from the press service of NATO's Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe told me that the general already had a pile of requests for interviews and statements on his desk and that PRAVDA's correspondent was 39th in line. As regards the general's attitude to the "Euromissiles" problem in the light of recent Soviet proposals, I was advised to consult a passage from B. Rogers' recent speech at the Belgian Institute for International Relations.

So what was said there by the U.S. general, who leaves his post as NATO supreme allied commander in June? He rejected outright, so to speak, the Soviet proposals and consequently his own President's "zero option." Rogers called on the governments of NATO countries to reject the idea of eliminating medium-range missiles and declared that such a solution would place NATO in a situation "worse than in 1979."

Rogers' speech was not outstanding in terms of abundant arguments. Just as before, he threatened the West Europeans with the Warsaw Pact countries' superiority in the conventional arms sphere and demanded that the problem of medium-range missiles be tied up in a single package with the question of reducing conventional and chemical weapons in Europe. He also dragged out the problem of tactical nuclear missiles. The general declared that acceptance of the Soviet proposals would introduce a split between the United States and Washington's West European allies and would have a negative effect on the West's policies.

So, what is the outcome: Is the entire company out of step, with the general alone marching in step? Of course, Rogers has only 3 months left in office and there are newspaper reports that he is not leaving entirely of his own volition. But it is impossible not to take such statements seriously.

Of course, by no means is everything progressing smoothly as regards approaches to matters of disarmament and the creation of an atmosphere of trust in Europe. Even so, a certain dynamic can be observed in this direction. Clear evidence of this can be seen in the stance taken by the five "Common Market" countries which spoke out in Turnout in favor of the complete elimination of medium-range missiles and the need for talks on other types of missiles.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW TV HITS WEINBERGER COMMENT ON 'SOVIET THREAT'

OW090047 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1045 GMT 8 Apr 87

[From "The World Today" Program, presented by Igor Kudrin]

[Text] Hello Comrades. It is no secret the question of complete elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in Europe is the prime problem.

Achieving their elimination is a contemporary demand. This is the opinion of Erhard Eppler member of the executive council of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.

In making a proposal on the reduction of military arsenals, he said, General Secretary Gorbachev is showing more activity in the sphere of disarmament than the present U.S. Administration.

I hope, Eppler said, those forces in the United States really aspiring to disarmament will gain the upper hand over the Pentagon hawks.

However, the topic of a nuclear-free world and agreement with the Soviet Union on eliminating nuclear arms [words indistinct] of many high-placed officials in the U.S. Administration. This particularly concerns the Pentagon boss Weinberger. One even wonders, at times, when he has time to engage in direct responsibilities? Not a day passes without an interview, a statement, or an article, and every time the same theme runs through all his pronouncements. This is the alleged Soviet military threat, and the supposed serious lag of the United States in the area of arms.

Here is an excerpt from his recent interview with the ABC's Good Morning America program: Apparently, very few people understand that we now have absolutely no defense against Soviet missiles. If we do not develop [sozdavat] the Strategic Defense Initiative, then the world will be far more dangerous than it is now. All agreements with the Soviets must be verifiable, so that they do not overtake us again.

Literally on the next day, the Pentagon chief was already talking on another program, intimidating CNN viewers: Soviet military power continues to grow. They have more tanks, more bombers, and more missiles. The Russians can accomplish whatever they wish in their country, but they cannot become less bellicose.

Weinberger would not be Weinberger if, in one of these interviews, he did not make threats, uncouth and crude threats devoid of any diplomatic factors, against our

country, somehow forgetting for a moment his claim about the decisive military superiority of the Soviets.

Just listen to how the genuine face of the U.S. militarists is manifested: The Soviets must know that we possess the ability to carry out a retaliatory blow if they attack us. We have the capability to deliver such a strong blow that they ought to understand that they should not attack. Such is the U.S. defense secretary's avowal.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: NATO NUCLEAR ARSENAL BELIES 'WEAKNESS' CLAIM

PM101255 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Major General F. Gontar (Reserve):
"Who Does Not Like the Idea of a Europe Without Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] For months, representatives of the United States and other NATO countries were constantly claiming that, if the Soviet Union took the question of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe out of the Reykjavik "package," an agreement on the elimination of these missiles could be reached without special difficulty. However, now that the words have to be translated into practical actions, it emerges that the prospect of ridding the European edifice of nuclear weapons does not suit the Western countries' ruling circles. Not by accident are they currently spreading all kind of fabrications and "arguments" in order to hamper or thwart altogether the achievement of an agreement on this problem. People in NATO, for instance, are claiming that if the Americans remove their Pershing-2 and long-range GLCM's from the continent, West Europe will be "unarmed" and "defenseless" in the face of the "Soviet nuclear threat." They are suppressing the following facts.

First. U.S. medium-range (1,000 km and over) nuclear weapon delivery vehicle comprise 640 nuclear-capable aircraft, including more than 400 F-111, F-16, and F-4 fighter-bombers. All of them can carry out strikes throughout the territory of the European socialist countries and a substantial part of the USSR's European territory. In addition, the U.S. Navy's 6th and 2d operational fleets, which include seven multipurpose aircraft carriers, are permanently deployed in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Around 300 nuclear-capable ground-attack aircraft are based on these aircraft carriers. Their range also enables them to carry out strikes against installations on the territory of the Soviet Union. In addition, these fleets' surface ships and nuclear submarines continue to be equipped with "Tomahawk" nuclear cruise missiles, which have a range of up to 2,600 km.

It should also be emphasized that the U.S. commander in chief in Europe has been allocated several hundred strategic missile nuclear warheads sited on U.S. missile-carrying submarines.

Second. The armed forces of the West European NATO countries (FRG, Italy, Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands, and others) have a total of over 200 nuclear-capable aircraft in their tactical strike aviation, 72 launch installations for the Pershing-1A ballistic missiles (FRG) with a range of more than 700 km; and more than 100 launch installations (some of them belonging to the U.S. ground forces in Europe) for the operational-tactical "Lance" missiles with a range of up to 130 km, which can be fitted with nuclear charges. U.S. ground forces in Europe and the forces of the West European

NATO countries have more than 2,000 203.2 mm and 155 mm nuclear artillery pieces. Using rocket-assisted projectiles, they have a range of up to 30 km.

Hatching aggressive plans against the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states, the United States has built more than 150 depots on the territory of West European countries where it has concentrated more than 7,000 nuclear munitions intended both for its own delivery vehicles and those of its NATO partners.

Third. The process of elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles from Europe would leave British and French nuclear means intact. And they, as is known, represent an impressive force which, furthermore, continues to be built up.

Thus, Britain has in its arsenal 4 SSBN's, each equipped with 16 launchers for Polaris A3TK ballistic missiles (6 warheads each) with a range of up to 4,000 km and also more than 200 nuclear-capable tactical aircraft. Development is under way of a MIRVed nuclear warhead for the Trident-2 SLBM which is to be bought from the United States in the early nineties. Four new British-built SSBN's with 16 launchers each are to be equipped with these missiles.

France has 6 SSBN's in its arsenal (with a total of 96 launchers). These SSBN's are equipped with either the M-20 single-charge ballistic missiles or the M-4 missiles with MIRVed warheads. There are 6 warheads on each M-4 missile. In addition, the French nuclear forces comprise 18 silo-based launchers for S-3 single-charge ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 3,500 km, up to 30 "Mirage" IVA strategic bombers, and also more than 70 nuclear-capable tactical strike aircraft with a range of more than 1,000 km. French ground forces have around 40 launchers for "Pluton" operational-tactical nuclear missiles.

Land-based S-4 strategic missiles with a range in excess of 5,000 km and sea-launched M-5 strategic missiles (with a range of up to 6,000 km) are in the process of development in France. Both missiles have MIRVed warheads. Hades, an operational-tactical missile, is being developed for the ground forces.

Thus NATO has up to 4,000 nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in Europe. What kind of "defenselessness" or "weakness" are they talking about? There is only one answer -- these claims are made by people who do not want to take the road of real nuclear arms reductions in Europe. A recent statement in the U.S. Congress by the deputy chief of staff of the U.S. Department of the Army can serve as an example. He insisted, in particular, that all 108 U.S. launchers in the FRG remain where they are and the two-stage medium-range Pershing-2 ballistic missiles (range up to 2,500 km) sited at these launchers be converted into the single-stage Pershing-1B version with a range of up to 800 km. Such a conversion would require only a simple modification -- removing the second stage from the Pershing-2 missiles and fitting the existing warhead (yield of up to 100 kilotons) using the existing first-stage coupling ring. The whole operation could be carried out in service conditions and would take up only a few hours. If this conversion were carried out, provision would be made for keeping intact all ground launching equipment and installations needed to service the missiles.

The sinister design behind this venture lies in the fact that, if it is that easy to convert the medium-range Pershing-2 ballistic missile into an operational-tactical Pershing-1B missile, it will be equally easy to change it back into its original version by adding the second stage.

The Pentagon also has corresponding plans for the long-range nuclear GLCM's (yield up to 200 kilotons, range up to 2,600 km). Thus it is proposed to remove these missiles from West European countries rather than eliminate them. Yet it is well known that the GLCM's are virtually the same as the sea-launched "Tomahawk" cruise missiles in design, weight, dimensions, and performance. [paragraph continues]

Surface ships and submarines could easily be equipped with them. And the Pentagon has proposed another option, namely leaving these missiles in Europe and replacing their nuclear charges with conventional ones.

All this indicates that certain U.S. circles really do not want to eliminate the Pershing and cruise missiles from Europe and are seeking to retain them merely under a different label. This shows that the "zero option" for medium-range missiles in Europe put forward by the U.S. Administration was nothing but a bluff from the outset, designed to deceive not just the European but also the American public.

As for the Soviet Union, it has expressed its readiness to destroy all its medium-range missiles stationed in Europe together with their launchers, provided that the United States does exactly the same. The dismantling and destruction of the missiles would have to take place in conditions of strict verification [kontrol].

The implementation of the Soviet proposals would be a real, major step toward completely ridding Europe of nuclear arms. The European peoples and the peoples of other continents are expecting this to happen, and the interests of the present and the future demand it.

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CSO: 5200/1421

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAGUE INTERVIEWS USSR'S ARBATOV ON GORBACHEV PROPOSALS

LD112236 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Interview with Academician Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States and Canada Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, by Moscow correspondent Stefan Simak, date and place not given; Arbatov in Russian with superimposed Slovak translation--recorded]

[Text] [Simak] Almost 1 and 1/2 months have passed since the Soviet Union proposed to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe. At the outset of this interview I have asked Academician Arbatov how he assessed the West's, and above all the United States, reply to this initiative.

[Arbatov] Up to 28 February, when we put forward our proposals, the West kept on repeating that the Soviet Union should accommodate the West's demand and remove this problem from the Reykjavik package. We have done so. The Americans, much more quickly than ever before -- and this we have welcomed -- have responded by putting forward their draft of the treaty in Geneva. There, however, it has been shown at the same time that they wanted to lead the preparation of the medium-range missiles treaty into a blind alley. They declared that they would not remove Pershing-2 missiles, but that they would merely dismantle one stage.

You can just imagine what a clamor this would have provoked if we proposed to do this very thing with our SS-20 missiles. At the same time, they announced that they would transfer cruise missiles to naval vessels, which could, however, operate in the vicinity of our shores. And finally, they want to preserve the entire infrastructure for these missiles. This means launching pads, communications, command posts, and all the rest.

[Simak] The United States links the elimination of the medium-range missiles in Europe with the issue of operational tactical missiles and with the reduction of conventional arms. How does Academician Arbatov see the prospects for the resolution of this problem?

[Arbatov] In this regard, the United States has been joined by its West European allies, although considerable differences exist among them. The Soviet Union wants to get talks on this issue moving. However, one has to bear in mind that it can only do so much. We have separated the issue of medium-range missiles from the package and the West is now trying to relink it. One can, however, manifest goodwill and flexibility in the interest of agreeing on the treaty only within certain limits and on the precondition that the West is interested in reaching an agreement. The Warsaw Pact

states have also proposed a radical reduction of conventional weapons and to begin talks also on other issues. Mikhail Gorbachev has made proposals but the West has been inventing new pretexts, but we do not think that this can go on forever, said Academician Arbatov. The importance of the public opinion is growing continuously; parliaments and governments of many countries, including in the West are beginning to question such a policy. This all can lead to certain results.

[Simak] At the close of the interview, I asked what Georgiy Arbatov thinks about the possibility of reaching an agreement with Ronald Reagan's government, whose decisionmaking process is beginning to be hampered by the preparation for the coming presidential elections.

[Arbatov] We proceed from the premise that an agreement is possible. We must not omit even the tiniest opportunity, since we are guided by the feeling of big responsibility. The situation however remains complicated due to the internal situation in the United States. This however does not exclude the possibility that the U.S. Government will in the end manifest an interest in signing certain treaties. We regard the treaty on medium-range missiles as realistic. This is why we have also made a whole number of concessions. Talks to be conducted with Secretary Shultz in Moscow next week will show a great deal and will be a kind of test of the real U.S. intentions in the spirit of the events of the past days and the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev.

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CSO: 5200/1421

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS COMMENTATOR VIEWS 'HISTORIC CHANCE' FOR EUROPE

LD131841 Moscow TASS in English 1706 GMT 13 Apr 87

["Our European Home Should Become Nuclear Weapon-Free"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow April 13 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

World public opinion has welcomed the Soviet Union's new disarmament initiatives formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during his visit to Prague.

Measures proposed by the U.S.S.R. with a view to ensuring a constructive solution to the problem of elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, indisputably the central issue at this moment, attracted special attention of the public.

To facilitate an early accord on medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union suggested, among other things, that discussions on the reduction and eventual elimination of missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometres deployed in Europe should be started without any linkage to the progress and outcome of the talks on the longer-range missiles.

The Soviet side also suggested that the U.S.S.R. and U.S. assume an obligation not to increase the number of their shorter-range systems in the duration of the talks.

The Soviet Union said it was ready, after an accord on the longer-range missiles was signed and regardless of the progress of discussions on the shorter-range missiles which had been deployed there as a countermeasure to the deployment of Pershing-2's and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The Soviet Union supported the address of the Governments of the G.D.R. and Czechoslovakia to the government of West Germany proposing a non-nuclear corridor in Central Europe. The Social Democratic Party of Germany is known to have contributed to the drafting of that idea.

In the opinion of the U.S.S.R., the realization of the proposals by Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece on a nuclear and chemical weapons-free zone in the Balkans would be of great importance.

Poland's active approach to greater confidence in Europe and the proposal by Finland and other Nordic countries of a nuclear-free zone of the area deserve attention, too.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Soviet Union and Western European countries are beginning to speak a common language on fundamentally important problems of ensuring security in their common European home.

During her recent visit to the Soviet Union Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher expressed the view that the solution to the problem of arms reduction was not in a buildup by those who had smaller arsenals but through a reduction by those who had bigger ones.

Addressing a Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship rally in Prague, Mikhail Gorbachev said that the U.S.S.R. was in favor of "rectifying the inequality in certain elements where it exists, only not through a buildup by the one who lags behind, but through reduction by the one who turned out to be ahead."

Margaret Thatcher emphasized during her stay in Moscow that it was hardly reasonable to seek a way for ensuring security at one stroke and that it would be more reasonable to move toward that goal step by step.

The Soviet leader said in Prague that the Soviet Union saw the process of lowering military confrontation in Europe as "a stage-by-stage process with the balance maintained at every stage at a level of reasonable sufficiency."

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the European direction of its foreign policy. Instead of a nuclear crematorium for Europe the Soviet Union proposes a peaceful development of European culture which has many faces and yet is something integral.

In such circumstances reports from Washington about President Ronald Reagan's decision to sharpen the tone at the arms control negotiations and toughen the U.S. stand on a number of accords reached in Reykjavik cannot but cause instantaneous attention. It is not accidental that such reports coincided with the publication by THE NEW YORK TIMES of an article by the Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger who warned readers against "excessive" expectations concerning an agreement on medium-range missiles.

More and more appeals are made the world over asking the administration of the United States to make the first really effective step in the field of disarmament.

The historic chance for ridding Europe of medium-range missiles must not be sacrificed to self-serving considerations of those who are opposed to peace and stability on this planet.

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CSO: 5200/1421

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

IZVESTIYA EDITORIAL ON NUCLEAR-FREE FUTURE

PM131621 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 1

[Editorial: "An Example of Goodwill"]

[Text] Let us recall: The idea that we should enter the next century as a nuclear-free age was put forward by our country just over a year ago. The best brains of mankind, the most eminent scientists, appraised the grandeur and nobility of the task at their true worth. It was supported by millions of people, politicians, and many governments. There were also people, however, who hastened to describe it as a fantastic dream, utopia even.

Let us recall: 18 months ago in Reykjavik the Soviet Union concretized its plan for the building of a nuclear-free world, and the sides were just a couple of steps away from a historic accord. The program for a world without nuclear weapons echoed so tangibly and so consistently in the Soviet proposals. That was perhaps the first time since the deadly load was dropped on Hiroshima that mankind came to believe that a world free from fear of a catastrophe ready to repeat itself on an incalculably greater scale was both possible and really attainable.

Reykjavik failed to produce the specific results that would have marked the beginning of a new chapter in the continuing history of mankind, but the faith in a nuclear-free future and the hope that was acquired are gathering strength day by day. More and more people on the planet are linking them with the USSR's peace initiatives.

Moscow is continuing the diplomatic offensive. Such was the overall response in the world to the new Soviet proposals made by M.S. Gorbachev during his visit to Czechoslovakia. Together with recognition of their all-embracing and nonstandard nature, from the very outset the numerous international responses hint at or, more frequently, openly ask the main question of the day: What will be the U.S. side's response to the USSR's new attempt to accelerate the achievement of agreement on medium-range missiles? Will it be constructive? Or will Washington, having once given the standard promise to study the proposals, find with the passage of time yet another trick to avoid a substantive conversation?

Those on whom the achievement of agreement directly depends verbally agree with us that nuclear arsenals must be reduced, although they are not reluctant to proclaim them to be a virtual blessing and a permanent guarantee against war. In words they are "for." But the sincerity of words in politics is either confirmed or refuted by deeds, by steps that are either taken or planned.

Believing that security based on the possibility of destroying one another several times over is no longer security, we propose to free the world from the nuclear threat to present and future generations. They, however, intend to replace nuclear deterrence with nuclear deterrence -- but on a higher and more dangerous, space-based level.

We are striving for the reduction and subsequent elimination of strategic arms. They deliberately and demonstratively discard the SALT II treaty, which limits the growth of strategic arsenals.

We want to rid Europe immediately of "Euromissiles." They seek pretexts and technical tricks to retain the Pershings in Europe.

We are ready to solve the problem of operational and tactical missiles by way of their reduction right up to complete elimination. They advocate the method of "buildup to agreed ceilings."

We and our allies, aware that genuine security in the continent of Europe is unattainable without a radical reduction of confrontation, believe: In order to put an end to fruitless arguments about imbalances, each side must eliminate its surpluses in whatever branch of the armed forces and conventional arms. Their viewpoint is that, to start with, the laggard must catch up. They of course believe that the West is the laggard and the more vulnerable.

We propose mutually acceptable ways to move the cause of disarmament, primarily in Europe, out of deadlock. They suspect concealed dirty tricks and encroachment on their security in each of our proposals. Recently they have even started perceiving a treacherous trap in their own "zero option" and are reversing their own move.

In the disarmament dialogue the U.S. side is behaving like a chess player who is intent on maintaining a stalemate position. It cannot -- or does not want to -- grasp that the negotiating table at which mankind's future is being decided is not a chess board from which you can ultimately rise victorious, leaving your partner vanquished. In a game where the stake is the life or death of human civilization, we are all compelled to play on the same team, and we have either to win together or lose together, together with the rest of mankind.

To recognize this unassailable truth, having risen above narrow political considerations of prestige, is to take on board the new political thinking and responsibility for present and future generations.

The Soviet Union favors a comprehensive approach to problems of disarmament -- nuclear, chemical, and conventional. We favor balanced and all-embracing security and peace, tranquility and good-neighborliness in the "all-European home." Among the questions that constitute the truly global and manifold problem of disarmament and security there is probably none on which the Soviet Union has not put forward radical proposals that take the other side's interests into account. Step by step our country is paving the way for joint progress toward a safe world. And if the goal is still distant, it is not due to a shortage of proposals by us or to their inadequacy, but to a lack of reciprocal willingness for specific accords on the part of the other side.

For several months after Reykjavik we were reproached for sticking to the "package" and thus missing the opportunity to conclude an agreement on medium-range missiles. But as soon as the Soviet Union singled out medium-range missiles from the complex of issues and made its proposal on reaching an immediate agreement, a new condition was put forward -- closer linkage between medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. But that condition too did not stop us, and our country gave its answer in Prague. But will it be the last?

The Soviet Union -- we will say it again -- favors an all-embracing approach. This has been confirmed by the complex of new and reaffirmed Soviet initiatives. But we are resolutely against losing amid a tangle of linkages and reservations the chance that has arisen of embarking on a path as yet unexplored in world politics -- not just arms limitation but arms reduction. And in proposing the commencement of a discussion of the operational and tactical missiles issue and setting the target of the elimination of all nuclear weapons in Europe, including battlefield weapons, we are urging that it be done in such a way as to avoid hindering an accord on what is at the moment the central problem -- medium-range missiles.

And if we are talking about the reduction and elimination of entire classes of nuclear armaments, questions of monitoring [kontrol za] the observance of concluded agreements as a very important condition of safeguarding security acquire qualitatively new significance. Therefore our country favors the formulation of the strictest verification [kontrol] measures. These measures, including on-site inspections, must cover the missiles and launch installations that remain after the reductions, both those that are operationally deployed [v boyevom sostave] and those at other facilities -- test sites, manufacturing plants, and training centers, including bases belonging to the other side in third countries.

The fewer weapons there are in the world, above all in Europe, the more room there will be for trust and cooperation. Our continent now has a unique chance to set an example of goodwill. This chance must not be missed.

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CSO: 5200/1421

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET COMMENTATOR SUMMARIZES NEW VERIFICATION PROPOSAL

LD150928 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 14 Apr 87

[Commentary by station commentator Viktor Levin]

[Text] The universal program for verifying the fulfillment of future agreements has attracted much public attention. The verification issue has been advanced by western politicians for years rather than months, pretty well as the key issue and, moreover, it has been put in such a way that the West appears to be in favor of verification, and the Soviet Union to be against it.

Let us not delve into history just now; let us turn to the events of the most recent past. At the end of February, right after the Soviet Union proposed separating the problem of the elimination of medium-range missiles from the general package of Soviet-U.S. nuclear and space weapons talks, the U.S. delegation in Geneva submitted a draft treaty which, as THE WASHINGTON TIMES noted, made provision for new strict verification procedures. At the same time, just like the participants in the talks on the U.S. side, the foreign media too made no great secret of the fact that these strict measures were intended to force the Soviet Union to adopt a defensive posture. It was possible to read in U.S. papers that the Russians were unlikely ever to agree to the presence of U.S. observers at Soviet industrial enterprises where missiles were produced.

But then the Russians responded. Speaking in Prague, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed that there should be appropriate verification in respect of the missiles and launchers left after reduction -- both those in the combat complement and those at other installations such as test ranges, manufacturing plants, training centers, and so on. Inspectors should also be admitted on the other side's military bases on the territory of a third country. Thus, it became quite evident that the Soviet Union was proposing that steps be taken that went farther than those suggested by the U.S. side. We are doing this because we are interested in effective verification and because we sincerely want an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles.

And now here is a characteristic thing. Many opinions are being voiced in the West on the proposals set forth in Prague. But the representatives of U.S. ruling circles are stubbornly keeping quiet on the issue of verification. And this suggests that our proposals have caught the U.S. Administration off guard, and that it used to talk about verification not to increase the reliability of an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles, but to use the verification issue as an excuse to retreat from agreement.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR SAID READY TO NEGOTIATE SHORT-RANGE MISSILES

AU101431 Paris AFP in English 1400 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, April 10 (AFP) -- The Soviet Union has expressed willingness to negotiate a reduction of shorter-range missiles, as well as conventional and chemical arms, before signing a treaty with Washington on medium-range weapons, during the first visit here by parliamentarians of the Western European Union (WEU).

The seven-nation WEU is the only European body with competence in defence matters, although a spokesman stressed that the delegation did not have a mandate to negotiate.

The WEU assembly chairman, Frenchman Jean-Marie Caro, told a news conference here at the end of a five-day visit that his delegation had pressed Soviet officials for a "formal and solemn commitment" on such immediate negotiations before Moscow and Washington signed an agreement eliminating medium-range missiles from Europe. Discussing the Soviet reaction, he said: "Nothing that we have heard could let us suppose that such a commitment could not be undertaken." When pressed for more details, Mr. Caro said that his Soviet hosts had recalled that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had already pledged to open negotiations on shorter-range intermediate weapons after signing a medium-range treaty.

"That is not enough for us," the WEU delegation replied, asking the Soviet side to take into consideration the European demands in the continuing U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations.

Mr. Caro said the talks here had been "long, very cordial" and "very frank" with officials who included Georgiy Arbatov, director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, and Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy, along with arms control experts and parliamentary officials. Asked how the Soviet Union viewed the strengthening of the WEU, Mr. Caro said that the fact that his delegation had been invited here by the Soviet parliament in February was a sign that Moscow hoped for a strengthening of Europe "on a political level".

Soviet officials had at no time during their discussions this week tried to drive a wedge between the European allies, and between Europe and the United States, he said.

The WEU has recently been given new vigour amid growing realisations that if U.S. nuclear missiles were dismantled in Europe, Western Europeans would have to unite to ensure their own defence.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has been hostile towards the pan-European body, and Mr. Caro recalled that Moscow had once called it a "poisonous snake". He said the change in attitude was due to the "new mentality" in the Soviet Union under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The organisation was revived in 1979 as a forum for European security by France, Britain, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux states. Britain's representative was not on the Moscow trip for "personal reasons", according to Mr. Caro.

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CSO: 5200/1421

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE VIOLATE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 13, 5-12 Apr 87 p 7

[Article by "Analyst at APN MILITARY BULLETIN": "Yet Another Treaty Violated"]

[Text]

THE US ADMINISTRATION has been coming under increasing criticism of late for its rejection of a number of arms control treaties. On the other hand, it is believed that among the agreements of this kind there is a document said to be highly consonant with American interests and which therefore will not be undermined by Washington. This view has been generated in every way possible by the NATO countries as well.

The document in question is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It could be called a very beneficial one if not for the fact that it has been violated on more than one occasion.

The proof of the West's non-adherence to its commitments under this document is out in the open. It is a programme for the development of nuclear weapons by Israel. It is an open secret where Israel gets fissionable materials and the necessary components for the construction of nuclear warheads from. True, it is being said that official Washington is steering clear of this. The conveyor belt, along which nuclear know-how, theoretical and existing, is supplied from across the Atlantic to Israel, is serviced by persons not listed as government employees or combining official service with unofficial occupations. Now and again they are caught and even punished. Thus the obvious turns into the improbable.

But the problem does not boil down to the covert export of nuclear technology and fissionable materials. Just as the range of users of this nuclear export does not amount to Israel alone.

The cardinal elements of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed on July 1, 1968, are its Articles 1 and 2. They say that each nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over them directly, or indirectly, whereas each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes not to

receive the transfer of nuclear weapons or of control over them directly, or indirectly.

If these provisions were projected onto the structure of nuclear decision making in NATO, this would immediately bring forth some very suspicious things. For instance, every NATO government has a right to pass a decision, that is, to give or not to give its consent to the delivery of a strike using NATO nuclear weapons - moreover, in the given case the question is of both "limited" and "universal" nuclear war.

In line with the official NATO concept, the nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe are under "dual control" - that of the US government and the country on whose territory they are located. A special NATO document envisages the maintenance under any circumstances of the complete sovereignty of the Alliance's member-countries and active consultations between governments before decisions affecting them directly, or indirectly have been taken. In other words, an American decision on the use of nuclear weapons cannot be taken against the will of the ally which allowed their deployment on its territory.

The NATO officials' interpretation of their own directions about a "double key" and a system of "political consultations" is very broad. As usual, these interpretations have always been adapted by them to the existing situation. When the so-called "dual-track decision" of NATO on the deployment of new American medium-range missiles in a number of West European countries was discussed in 1979, every effort was made to stress the participation of the "masters of the house" in the introduction of nuclear weapons. However, when it came to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it was alleged that everything remained under the exclusive control of the Americans. No matter what has been said by way of beating about the bush, a sufficient number of NATO secrets have already been revealed.

including those marked "COSMIC", to draw fully substantiated conclusions.

A little over ten hours is required for a request from the battlefield corps command of any NATO country, directed through army communications, to reach the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, then the NATO Council (or the Military Planning Committee) and, lastly, the US President. Then, after a decision has been taken, the request is returned along the same lines. The following is significant: the initiators of a nuclear decision may be the field commanders, for instance, of Belgium, the FRG or the Netherlands. Isn't this tantamount to gaining access to nuclear weapons? The same applies to a decision of the Military Planning Committee which is composed of representatives from all members, including non-nuclear-weapon member-states of NATO.

In the context of the ever increasing improvement of weapons it is fully legitimate to say that the European NATO countries are gaining ever wider access to nuclear weapons. After all, highly accurate medium-range missiles with a low flying time, such as Pershing-2s, for example, increase the probability of poorly

controlled joint decisions in crisis situations. In addition to this, there is also a growing danger of the beginning of preemptive operations due to an unclear and incorrectly assessed situation, in which those NATO countries that do not possess nuclear weapons will also take part.

"New questions" arise, so to speak, in connection with the deployment of nuclear weapons in space and the involvement of some allies of the USA in the implementation of the SDI programme. Suffice it to recall at least the directive of the Western European Union Assembly held in December 1984. According to this document, the Union should become the "chief instrument" in formulating a single policy towards using outer space for military purposes and maintaining the "closest relations" on this question with the US government. One must presume that additional decisions have also been adopted in this direction since then.

The aforementioned facts and other similar data indicate that the United States and its allies have reduced the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to predominantly technical commitments, if not strictly technical and formal commitments.

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CSO: 5200/1425

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW: FRG FIGURES ON INF IN EUROPEAN SECURITY CONTEXT

OW040817 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0410 GMT 4 Apr 87

["Studio 9" program presented by Professor Valentin Zorin, political observer of Soviet television and radio, with Helmut Schmidt, former FRG chancellor, Egon Bahr, leading Social Democratic figure and Bundestag member; Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union faction of the ruling party in the FRG Bundestag; Lothar Ruehl, state secretary of the FRG Defense Ministry; Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the APN Board; and Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; German participants speak in German with superimposed translation]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. In our talk today in Studio 9 of the Ostankino television center, we have decided to discuss the problems of the political situation in Europe.

At the invitation of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, a group of prominent West German political figures has visited Moscow and we decided to take advantages of their presence to invite them here and ask them to take part in discussing this most important political problem.

I wish to introduce you to our guests: Mr Helmut Schmidt, former FRG chancellor, Egon Bahr, a leading figure in the Social Democratic Party and Bundestag member -- you have had an opportunity to meet him here in Studio 9; Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union [CDU-CSU] faction of the ruling party in the FRG Bundestag; Lothar Ruehl, state secretary of the FRG Defense Ministry; and -- let me introduce the Soviet participants in our broadcast -- Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the APN Board; and Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Recent breakthroughs on the world political arena are perhaps most clearly seen on our old European Continent. A new concept has even appeared in the political dictionary: the European common household. The Soviet proposal to withdraw American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe is an action directed at making this household less dangerous for all its inhabitants. I would like to begin our talk today by posing a question to everyone here, all of the participants, and to ask them to answer it briefly. The question is: Regarding the present situation in Europe, what are you satisfied with and what are you dissatisfied with? We will begin with you, Mr Chancellor.

[Schmidt] The political situation in Europe was better 12 years ago; in 1975, when a conference was held in Helsinki. Then the economic situation of all the European states was not as yet subjected to the damaging effects of the world economic crisis, as is the case today. Nevertheless, I am happy that we now are not living under the fear to imminent war, and the economic situation is better than in the 1950's and 1960's. What I would like to see is greater freedom of travel and contacts for all, both in Western, and Eastern Europe.

[Zorin] Mr Ruehe.

[Ruehe] It is good that there is peace in Europe. It is bad that this peace is preserved by a large number of weapons on both sides. It is bad that Europe remains divided, that in this common household we do not have the opportunity to interact freely. It is good that there are signs that Europeans are not happy to accept this state of affairs and that perhaps talks will reach such a stage that we will return to detente. This would affect every citizen in the Soviet Union and the FRG.

[Zorin] Mr Bahr.

[Bahr] I regret so much that traditional distrust is left over from the days of the cold war. There also is too much prejudice. I would like to see, through better knowledge of each other and wider exchange of information, this situation eliminated and an atmosphere of understanding and trust created.

[Zorin] Mr Ruehl, please.

[Ruehl] I wish to continue with what Mr Ruehe was saying. The level of confrontation between the armed forces in East and West Europe is much too high, much too great. The people of Europe not only can but must, in their common interests, strive for reduction of military forces. A prerequisite to this would be the results of talks to ensure an approximate balance of power. To achieve this, military superiority of one side over the other must be eliminated.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] I am particularly unhappy with the fact that during the past 12 years the number of unresolved problems has increased. What gives me hope is the growing confidence, the growing wish in Europe to find a way out of the present situation, to establish cooperation, to understand each other as we are, both in the East and in the West; and, based on respect for each other's interests, to find ways for more stable, more productive, more reliable in all aspects, cooperation.

[Zorin] Vitaliy Vladimirovich.

[Zhurkin] What I like is that in Europe, perhaps unlike any other place in the world, an infrastructure of talks, attempts to reach agreement on solutions to problems on security, economic, humanitarian, and other areas of cooperation, has developed. What I do not like is that these talks have not as yet led to either side destroying even one missile, one tank, one plane, not a single weapon. I am not at all happy with this sad state of dialectics.

[Zorin] I have listened carefully to your replies. Mr Ruehe, I have the impression that your answer contains a note of pessimism. Perhaps I am mistaken. I would like to ask you in relation to this, how do you ideally perceive the European security situation?

[Ruehe] I am not a pessimist. I am a realist. I feel that we need a broadened understanding of security. The problem of disarmament would not exist if there were greater confidence between people. Therefore, the theme of human rights -- greater freedom, more frequent meetings -- is related to missiles and tanks. We cannot achieve the necessary confidence if we do not open the immured doors in Europe. That is why Western Europe is watching with such keen interest developments in the Soviet Union, the process of new thinking, the interesting debates, and discussions. All of this has very important significance. If everything is reduced to tanks and planes, then we will not achieve security and confidence in Europe.

[Falin] I think that this is a somewhat simplistic -- if you will allow me to put it this way -- summary of the problems. If we are to turn to past experiences, then often wars occurred between those countries that did not have problems of freedom of movement, exchange of ideas, and so on. Moreover, even today some of the wars and conflicts are taking place precisely between such countries. That is why to reduce the problems of the arms race and security to a level at which people will simply be able to have free and easy contact with each other, perhaps means avoiding some of the more difficult problems, thus dooming the solution to these problems to prolonged inaction.

Here we should think not only about the compatibility of concepts of rights, freedoms, and so forth, but also about compatibility of philosophies -- state philosophies, and philosophies of military doctrines, and many other things that have not made our lives easy in recent years and decades.

[Zorin] I feel that the open wish and goodwill, which must not be muddled by some aspiration for scoring propaganda points or to take advantage of problems, are also very important. The tasks facing us are too important to think about scoring propaganda points. This is my point of view. Mr Bahr, I have read your statements expressing the idea that it is necessary to create a situation in which -- as the diplomats say -- de facto war in Europe would become impossible. Could you perhaps elaborate on this idea here today?

[Bahr] A situation in central Europe has developed today in which both sides are armed to such an extent that they are afraid of war. No one can say with absolute confidence that these weapons will not be used. I feel that it would be better to begin disarming, to disarm to a certain level where neither side would be in a position to attack the other. This is not limited to atomic weapons only. It concerns conventional weapons as well. This would mean that both sides would remain capable of defending themselves, but not capable of attacking because there would be insufficient weapons for this. Then the strategy will change and we can be sure of security.

[Zorin] Thank you. Mr Chancellor, based on your numerous experiences as defense minister and federal chancellor, could you answer this question: Do you share this point of view or not? Do you see it as a trend at least? To save time I also would like to ask you a second question: What difference do you see in the line implemented by Chancellor Kohl in the area of European politics, and the line which you implemented when you were chancellor of the FRG?

[Schmidt] First, permit me to answer the second question. This answer will not be to the liking of Kohl, nor to my party comrades. I do not see any great difference. As for the first question, the words of my friend Egon Bahr seem too optimistic. He said that both sides should build defenses in such a way that it would be possible to defend oneself, but it would not be possible to attack.

In practice, this is not easy. But I do agree that we should aspire to this. It means that no one would need bombers; they would simply need interceptor aircraft. This does not mean that no one needs tanks, because tanks also are needed for defense. The French could do nothing against Hitler with the Maginot defense line. On this point I am somewhat more skeptical than my friend Egon Bahr, but this is related to the fact that I used to be a defense minister.

In everything else I agree with Mr Ruehe. We spoke of pessimism and optimism. I am for viewing things as they are, without putting on dark glasses of pessimism or rosy glasses of optimism.

[Zorin] A question for you, Mr Ruehe. Chancellor Schmidt does not see any particular difference between the political line of the Kohl government, the government of your party, or the policy pursued by his government. Do you see any difference?

[Ruehe] I am proud of the fact that my country's policy is consistent. Even when it was in the opposition, the CDU-CSU in many ways supported Federal Chancellor Schmidt on such important issues as the security policy. This is why, I repeat, we are pursuing a consistent policy as far as the fundamental points of Western and security policy are concerned, as well as questions concerning Eastern policy and relations between both German states. No breaks have occurred in this and this is good.

I think our neighbors in the West and East should be gratified by the consistency of our policy. Governments change, and although our government is very good, [laughter] nevertheless it will depart at some time and it is important for our neighbors that our policy remain consistent.

[Bahr] I would like to make a brief remark. Naturally I am very happy that the present Federal Government considers good the basis of an agreement against which its leaders spoke out sharply at one time. Herein lies the consistency of policy. I think if the Social Democrats had retained power we would have done all of this better and certain difficulties would not have arisen. But I am very happy that overall everything is proceeding along the path we set.

[Zorin] I understand why today, here in "Studio 9," you are exhibiting more unity among yourselves than sometimes transpires when you are home in Bonn. [laughter] I understand this, but I would like...[indistinct interjections] Well, I have expressed my opinion. Now I would like to ask you, Valentin Mikhaylovich, the same question I asked Mr Chancellor and Mr Ruehe. After all, you were our country's ambassador to the government of Chancellor Schmidt and can judge these comparisons not through books or newspapers but from personal experience. How would you respond to this question?

[Falin] Well the question -- as they say here occasionally -- is interesting, but nevertheless it is a question that is very difficult to answer. It is difficult to answer the question how a policy of detente and a policy of rejecting detente can be correct at the same time. I have in mind the detente policy that the U.S. Administration recognized at one time, and the antidetente policy which the Reagan administration proclaimed when it came to power.

To favor detente is probably somewhat different from opposing detente -- as was the case under the chancellor's...[changes thought halfway through word "chancellor"] as occurs to some extent under the Reagan government -- and at the same time to continue consistently the policy that we have spoken about.

In brief, internal contradictions exist here, they are obvious, and insofar as we are not in the Bundestag or in some kind of unusual situation, we should see them on the Soviet side, we should see them and draw the corresponding conclusions — as realists, I repeat, not as pessimists.

[Zorin] Perhaps I exaggerate a bit, but I think I will be close to the truth when I say that detente, which played such a great role — particularly in Europe — stumbled and found itself frozen when the struggle around the placement of U.S. Pershing missiles on European territory arose. I see that Chancellor Schmidt does not agree with me, but I want to complete the question. Mr Schmidt, I will give you an opportunity to express your opinion, but I want to return to the question: Can the Soviet proposal on intermediate-range missiles become a serious step toward renewing detente? Both political and military detente?

Second, in connection with this, do you not think that precisely this prospect frightens certain circles, particularly those across the ocean?

[Schmidt] I do not share your view that only one reason exists for the fact that the phase of political detente between the West and East ended, unfortunately, during the latter half of the 1970's. Earlier I said that Helsinki was a culminating point. Today we can say that it ended soon after the Helsinki meeting.

There were several reasons. One was the Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles, which did not exist before the second half of the 1970's. The second was the West's reaction to this. Here I must agree with this reaction, and I would like to add that our reaction was inevitable. The third reason was Afghanistan. The fourth was the crisis in Poland, and the fifth reason was the world economic crisis, which in the West destabilizes the political situation more than in Eastern Europe.

Generally, I could say there were numerous reasons, and overall there was an absence of the necessary political strength in Eastern Europe, Moscow, and Western Europe to cope with all of this. We should not heap responsibility for the end of the detente period on one another. We should now talk about how to return to a policy of detente, about whether there is a bridge or path to it.

With regard to this you mention the question of medium-range missiles on both sides. There are Soviet medium-range missiles known as SS-20's and Western ones known as Pershing-2's. Since 1979 I have believed that there should be neither. In 1980 I proposed to Gorbachev's predecessor a zero option for both sides. I made the same proposal in 1981 to Mr Reagan when he visited us. You did not agree to this proposal at the time. Now Gorbachev wants this, but there is no assurance that Reagan does. So let us not blame each other. The Germans, in any case, want to see the missiles on both sides eliminated and want to see short-range [blizhnego radiusa] missiles of both sides removed, and we are right; this would be a path of detente, or at least to the beginning of detente.

But not much time remains, because at the end of this year, 1987, the preelection struggle will begin in the United States, and then it will not be possible to ratify any treaties. Therefore, we have only until the end of 1987. Now if the treaty must be ratified in 1987, then it must be ready no later than October. We have already experienced a situation such as this when the SALT II treaty was concluded, but it was not ratified because the United States was on the eve of a preelection struggle. It has not been ratified to this day, so I ask the Soviet Union and the United States to hurry up.

[Falin] I think the picture we have just seen and heard is not entirely complete, and therefore not quite accurate. The first Soviet SS-20 missiles appeared in 1976, and not at the beginning of the year, I might add. But the appearance of the Soviet SS-20 missile was preceded, as we all recall, by President Ford's statement virtually rejected the policy of detente. At that time, President Ford essentially removed detente, the pursuit of a policy of detente, and made this the aim and one of the slogans of his upcoming presidential election campaign.

Apparently, this was preceded by something else. Apparently this was preceded particularly by U.S. Administration thoughts about the placement of those very Pershing-2's in Western Europe, the decision made not in connection with the SS-20, but was adopted in principle at the end of the 1960's relating to a change in NATO doctrine.

I feel, and I would be prepared to debate this issue with the participants, that the oil crisis of 1973-74 had a very deep effect on the Western approach to the problems of detente, cooperation, and the evaluation of Soviet actions and intentions. It was precisely against the background of another war in the Middle East and the refusal of the United States to cooperate with us in the political solution to the questions of this region that the detente crisis began. This developed later; then new circumstances and new reasons were added, but, the beginning, so to speak, of the beginning is related to this moment, to this period.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich, I would like to ask you one question in relation to what Mr Chancellor has been saying about the placement of SS-20 missiles: Was this step a mistake on our part?

[Falin] It is difficult to speak of mistakes. The focal point was using up the stocks of our SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. After the United States had practically refused to consider the question of eliminating the medium-range potential, the question invariably arose as to the replacement of old, outdated missiles with new ones. Within the context of the tasks that the old missile potential of the Soviet Union was set to perform and the tasks that the new potential had to cope with, there were no strategic or operational changes. The question of how many missiles would replace the previous ones, how they would be counted -- a missile for a missile or a warhead for a warhead -- is another question altogether. Here we are discussing principles. The need to replace the missiles arose after no solution was found to the main question, I repeat, that of eliminating the nuclear medium-range potential in Europe, because the United States was not ready to consider this zero option on a mutually acceptable basis at the moment.

[Zorin] I see that the state secretary of the Defense Ministry is very anxious to answer Mr Falin. Is that not the case?

[Ruehl] I consider Mr Falin to be mistaken on three points. First, the SS-20 missiles were not developed in 1976. You began developing this weapon in the beginning of the sixties, and you began testing these missiles at the beginning of 1974. In a discussion similar to the one we are having today with then Federal Chancellor Schmidt, we warned the Soviet participants in the discussion about the placement of these missiles, because it was not merely a simple replacement of antiquated missiles, strategically, it was an increase in the medium-range strike weapon potential, adapted specifically to Western Europe.

Second, we had no medium-range missiles or cruise missiles in Western Europe since 1963. They had been taken out of there. We were hoping that the Soviet Union would not renew this medium-range potential. It was a real shock for us when we found out that this potential was not only being modernized but, with three warheads on each missile, was becoming more powerful. This is what forced Chancellor Schmidt to issue his warnings.

Third, in 1980 we came out with the zero option proposal. We welcome the fact that the Soviet leadership, headed by Mikhail Gorbachev, has now agreed to this proposal. Having consent on this, we can now eliminate these systems on both sides. This is a step forward in the European policies on security. This also would mean progress in American-Soviet relations. It would make a contribution to the cause of limiting East-West conflict and to the cause of detente between the East and the West.

Now we must pay attention to conventional weapons and eliminate Warsaw Pact superiority in Europe, which is particularly burdensome to us. These will be long and difficult talks, requiring intellectual honesty on both sides, as well as goodwill and patience. I think that both sides will rise to the occasion.

[Bahr] I wish to touch on what has just been discussed. First, if the new thinking had appeared 7 or 8 years ago, then there would have been no Pershing or cruise missiles, or SS-20 missiles. Second, one Soviet author during a similar discussion said that we should not be playing ping pong. This means that we should not be exchanging arguments when each one is attempting to make use of his advantages. Such an approach to history will lead us nowhere. We have a new type of thinking. Let us look forward and think: We can now have a zero option. This leads me to my third thought. I hope that we will achieve this zero option.

Helmut Schmidt is absolutely correct. Time is limited. It is running out. I am not sure that we will achieve this solution if after such a package of proposals is opened, the West begins wrapping up another package.

Anticipating opposition in the Bundestag, I welcomed the announcement by the federal chancellor who said: Now the zero option solution for medium range missiles, later, talks on short-range missiles. Here faith in the word of the FRG Government is at stake. I hope that it will not retreat from this position. It is a general position, and it is in the interest of Europe.

[Zorin] Before allowing Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin to have a word, I wish to make only one point. Here we heard the term conventional weapons and Mr Ruehl spoke about the Warsaw Pact superiority in this area. Personally, I belong to those who are in total disagreement with the term conventional weapons. I consider this term to be obsolete.

[Ruehl interrupts] Conventional armed forces.

[Zorin] Speaking about conventional armed forces, and this is tied to conventional weapons, I feel that the term is obsolete first because conventional armed forces are armed today with conventional weapons that differ little from atomic weapons in their destructive power. Especially, if we speak about Europe, with its density of population and with its number of cities. I wish that our West German colleagues would proceed from the assumption that we in the Soviet Union are not in any way thinking about preserving some sort of superiority in anything, including in conventional weapons. We are speaking about the real reduction of all types of weapons, including those considered to be conventional. Vitaliy Vladimirovich, please.

[Zhurkin] First I have a brief comment on the question of ping pong about which Mr Ruehl spoke. Even if we are to accept his version that the SS-20's were first tested in 1974, there is now documentary proof that the Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles were first tested in 1969-72. That is before 1974. We also have something to say on the question of Afghanistan and other issues to those who touched on them. But I am in full agreement with Egon Bahr and other West German colleagues who said that there is no need to play ping pong or to look back, because if we constantly look over our shoulders, we will not go forward and there will be no new thinking.

That is why I would propose to return to the specific questions of today about which we spoke. In particular, the remark made by Chancellor Schmidt about the short time remaining to reach agreement on medium-range missiles made a strong impression on me. But a large doubt also exists. The Soviet Union, in order to facilitate this solution, to make use of this short period of time, has separated the medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package and put forth this question. The United States immediately ties its own package to these missiles. In particular it is trying to shove the question of increased-range operational and tactical missiles into this package or, reduced-range [ponizhennoy dalnosti] missiles as they are called. I have a feeling that despite everything, the FRG position has its own nuances on this question, as do a number of other European NATO countries that are of the opinion, I think, taking into the account the short time left, that missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km should be discussed at a later date, and with their complete destruction in mind, which is our position. I would like to hear the opinion of our West German colleagues on this issue.

[Zorin interrupts] I would just like to say that circumstances have appeared recently that cause alarm. First of all there are Washington's attempts to link the problem of medium-range missiles with the problem of limited-range [ogranichennoy dalnosti] missiles.

Second, there are attempts to devise some kind of strange operation around the modernization of Pershing missiles, the removal of one component of the missiles but leaving the Pershings in Europe, instead of agreeing, as Reagan first said, to their withdrawal. This creates the impression that some officials in Washington are unhappy with the zero option that was talked about. This, at any rate, is the impression the Soviet public gets. Mr Ruehe, you wanted to say something.

[Ruehe] We want to remain loyal to our previous policy and we came out in support of a zero option before the Soviet Union. I do not want to fight past battles, but we must remember one thing for the future. We must save an entrance way for ourselves. We should not arm ourselves, then arm ourselves further so that serious talks can begin as has happened in the past, unfortunately. Talks should be held first. We remain loyal to our position on the zero option — this is a West German as well as an American position — but for both sides.

In 1983 it was possible to have a version that meant zero on our side and preservation of missiles on the Soviet side. No, we want zero-zero. As far as short-range missiles are concerned, we said in 1981 that...

[Zorin interrupts] Excuse me please. Who are we?

[Ruehe] NATO, which has been conducting talks since 1981. In this case complete unity exists between the Americans and Germans.

[Zorin] I understand, but this does not conform with the latest statements made by Washington in the last few days.

[Ruehe] I would say now that in its latest statement its position was that there should not be any new zones for the arms race. In the 1970's the superpowers concluded two treaties on intercontinental missiles. The arms race was then transferred to the area of medium-range missiles. The problems we have been talking about then appeared, so the zero option for medium-range missiles should not be linked here with a decision on short-range missiles. This is simply a firm promise concerning future talks and concerning this aim.

Now what is this aim? It is our opinion that the aim lies in arriving at the minimum number of systems and equal rights, of course, or zero. Less systems. If we talk about zero, then the problem must be linked with conventional weapons. So we have given an absolutely unequivocal yes to the zero option. But we must frustrate the transfer of the arms race to another area, for example to the area of short-range weapons, so that no new systems are developed [sozdavat] in this area as occurred with medium-range missiles. Agreement must be reached on talks on this question and the aim of the talks — disarmament in this area — must be clearly set down, as well as equal rights for both sides.

Over a period of several months, decisions on medium-range missiles can be worked out and agreement can be reached on the aim of talks on short-range missiles, if there is a political will to achieve agreement. We must not only think in a new way, we must also arrive at new efforts, on both sides, because we need a completely verifiable agreement. In reality this means that U.S. servicemen will have to carry out on-site verification on Soviet soil, and, of course, the other way around. To date, this has not occurred, and so objectively we still face certain difficulties and certain complex problems.

So it is completely incorrect to argue and to maintain that there is a lack of desire here or there. No, there is a will, there is a desire, but objective difficulties remain, but we can eliminate them in the next few months. This is the common opinion of the Western alliance.

[Falin] If you permit, Valentin Sergeyevich, I want to state with regard to Mr Ruehe's words: The other way around, well it is the other way around that usually becomes much more difficult, as Reykjavik showed. When we proposed on-site inspection to the United States, it turned out that inspection of Soviet facilities was good, but the other way around, as the U.S. representatives said, would be more difficult.

[Ruehl interrupts] Nein.

[Falin] No it is not Nein. It is true, because this was declared by Mr Perle — he declared it in my presence — therefore it is fairly difficult to say no, and in this case your comment on inaccuracies, so to speak, will find no confirmation.

But I also would like to say that we seemed to agree not to talk about history, but, nevertheless, Mr Ruehe just made a statement and from what he said it appears that we are returning to history. Who initiated the zero option? You say that your West German zero option proposal has a longer history than the Soviet one. But you are incorrect. We proposed a zero option for medium-range weapons to the Americans at the end of the 1960's and if, as you say, there were two agreements that touched only on strategic missiles or strategic weapons, then ask yourself the question: Why only strategic weapons? Who was against including nonstrategic weapons in these agreements?

The United States was against this. It did not accept our corresponding proposals. This is a documented fact. These documents need not be recognized, but they also cannot be refuted. Besides, as you know, in November 1981, we proposed a zero option for nuclear weapons in Europe in general. This would be a zero option. However, as I understand your words today, you are not ready for this kind of zero option even today, for various reasons.

But, nevertheless, I would like to appeal to you, if time permits, to discuss more substantially what can be done today, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and not to argue about history. We view history from different perspectives, and we see different features in this history. Let us try to take a look at the future from the same perspective.

[Zorin] Mr Chancellor Schmidt.

[Schmidt] I am in complete agreement with the last proposal made by Mr Falin. I think that it is very useful to study history. It always enriches one's knowledge. But there is no sense in giving various interpretations of historic events for 2-3 minutes to engage in exchanges with one another on this. I do not want to take part in a game of ping pong with history. But my neighbor to the left, or was it you, Mr Chairman, spoke about Reykjavik and about the package of proposals. I want to make a philosophical remark.

I was frightened by the package of proposals made in Reykjavik by Mr Gorbachev because it proposed to solve many things at once. I am an old man with great experience in political activity, and I know that it is a rare event when a large problem is solved at once. What I learned, be it in economic or foreign policy or in military policy, was that if there is an aim to be achieved, then it is necessary at first to make the first step, then the second, and then the third.

To take a thousand steps at once sounds wonderful, but this rarely happens. It frightened me when I heard of the entire package of proposals made in Reykjavik. I fully agree that what Mr Gorbachev did made it possible to take the first step. This concerns the zero option for medium-range missiles.

Now the second philosophical idea. When I was still actively involved in politics, I made many appearances, including at the United Nations. I spoke about the need for partnership relations between both sides. The Soviet Union cannot preserve its peace alone. Neither can the United States and Western Europe preserve our peace alone. For this we need the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. For this you need us and the Americans and NATO to preserve peace. We can only take little steps together.

There is one point that plays a major role in this; it also played a major role during our meetings here and during our talk with Mr Gromyko, whom I had an opportunity to visit. I am talking about restructuring, which today plays a major role in the Soviet Union. We are talking about economic restructuring. As I understand it, you are staking great hopes on restructuring. I can only advise you to take one step after another. I say this on the basis of my experience in the area of economics. Do not immediately lay too many hopes on this. But there is one thing that I know for certain. The biggest step that you can take, and one of the most important steps that the Americans can take, if they want to improve the economic situation, is to reduce military spending. All the money that today is being spent on the production of cannons or aircraft, or tanks or missiles, can be used for the construction of apartments, the manufacture of television receivers, or automobiles for ordinary people.

What is happening in the PRC made an enormous impression on me. That country is a very long way from here, but it is a very important country. It is the world's third market. They have enormous economic problems and the standard of living is very low -- \$300 a year per capita. It is hard to imagine how poor the country is.

During the era of Mao Zedong a great amount of money was spent by them for military purposes. Now they have decided to start economic restructuring. The Chinese have a different name for it. They made the unilateral decision to decrease military expenditures. They are not tied to a partnership with either the Soviet Union or the United States. They reduced their military expenditure. Modernization in the areas of science, research, education, and the economy was given first priority. Modernization in the area of defense was reduced to second priority. This truly is a new form of thinking. I would like to wish you as well as us in the West the same.

We are spending much too much of our productive forces on defense. At the same time, we are neutralizing each other and are hindering our mutual economic progress.

[Zorin] I perceive a contradiction in what you were saying, Mr Chancellor, and before I allow Valentin Mikhaylovich to have a word, I would like to draw your attention to the following: On the one hand you have been convincing us and our television viewers that there is little time left, that we are in a time of trouble, while at the same time you speak out in favor of small steps. I see a clear contradiction between these two premises. Valentin Mikhaylovich, please.

[Falin] I am in agreement with Mr Schmidt that we must not miss out on opportunities, even little ones if they present themselves, in order to move forward. As far as Reykjavik is concerned: There, an attempt was made to make a breakthrough.

A breakthrough may well have been possible; it may have been one of those rare instances about which you spoke -- an occasion that could have been historic. It was an historic opportunity that could have turned the development of world events into a fundamentally new channel. If not for the persistence of the Americans on the well-known question of SDI, then a decision such as this could have become a reality. But the matter is not that the opportunity was not taken. In any case, when we speak about medium-range missile talks, we still lean on the experience gained at Reykjavik. In essence, the Soviet proposal, as put forth at the talks in Geneva, is the proposal that was worked out at the end of the medium-range talks in Reykjavik. It is precisely that version of decisions which was there and which was not tied to any additional conditions, as the United States is now doing. These additional conditions are a step backwards by the American side in comparison to Reykjavik.

I feel that there is one more point that needs to be mentioned. We do not perceive our proposals on medium-range missiles as a final step in the struggle for a nuclear free world and a nuclear free Europe or in disarmament as a whole. We see our proposal and its achievement as a very large step, as a very important way station on the road to a better world in which there will be no threat to the destruction of mankind. We see this step as a precondition to the creation of that universal security where stability in the interests of security for one is a condition for creating the same stable security for the other. We do not wish, and this was said on many occasions by Mikhail Sergeyevich, to have better security for ourselves than we are prepared to make available to the Americans, or to any other country. But we do wish the other states, and that includes the United States, would recognize our rights to similarly normal and good security for us and our friends.

I am prepared to say more, citing Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, that it is not a problem for us to bring down the military potential to a level that would be completely consistent with the requirements of defense and exclusively for defense. This is not a problem for the Soviet Union. We are prepared for such talks, for such decisions. That is why we would have been pleased if NATO had viewed and reacted to the proposals that are being put forward by the socialist countries in a more lively manner.

[Zorin] Mr Ruehe.

[Ruehe] I favor the policies under the following banner: Let us do that which can be done. Let us not concern ourselves with utopia. There are some who pursue utopia to hide their inability or their unwillingness to take specific steps. Therefore, I maintain that the zero option for medium-range missiles would be a major step. We will fulfill our responsibilities if this step is taken this year, for during the past 10 years there have been no such agreements. The SALT treaties have determined only the upper arms limits. They were not agreements on disarmament. This then, would be the first instance of an agreement on disarmament, with broad verification possibilities. Therefore, this would be a major step forward, the next step forward. We must not allow ourselves to be led away from this by becoming involved with utopia. We must take this step. Then we will acquire the strength to take further steps. We have time this year to reach such an agreement.

I think that what we need is mutual security. Each must try to understand the legitimate security interests of the other. No one today can single-handedly ensure security for oneself.

In the West, we are dispirited by the fact that the Soviet Union, in our opinion, in the area of conventional weapons, has created a potential that does not correspond to the legitimate interests of security. This should be discussed in the coming years.

This should be discussed by the Warsaw Pact and by NATO, where the security of countries is ensured. Only a defensive potential should be preserved. Let us not concern ourselves with utopia. Let us not now talk about a world without weapons. But this is not enough. One has to place oneself in the position of the other country. That is why we must ensure general security at the disarmament talks.

[Bahr] Mr Ruehe, I disagree with you on one point. You use the word utopia in a negative way. I consider that to be wrong. I need to have some prospects, say to the year 2000. That is only 13 years. Two years ago one would have been ridiculed if one said that one wanted to make the world nuclear-free. Do you wish to say that this is utopian? I would like to say that it is a goal.

I experienced great satisfaction when the U.S. President, together with Mr Gorbachev, put their signatures to this goal. We have no cause to say that they are utopians. I consider them to be people who have placed before themselves achievable goals. We must not be merely optimists. We realistically must think through what steps must be taken to get closer to this goal. I do not know whether we will reach this goal by the year 2000. Perhaps we will reach it by the year 2005. That also would be good.

[Ruehl] Mr Chairman, I would like to clarify that when I said no before, it was in regard to the words of Mr Falin. This was in regard to the position of the FRG Government and not with what was agreed upon at Reykjavik and about which you spoke with Mr Perle. I did not have that in mind. We have a political position. It is

quite simple. Verification will take place on our territory. As we are speaking, officers of the Bundeswehr together with officers of other NATO member countries are observing the military maneuvers of the Soviet Union and the GDR. They are being accompanied by Soviet and GDR officers. This is taking place in accordance with the Final Act signed at Helsinki and according to the decision of the Stockholm conference. I consider this to be an important specific step forward. This is the path that we must follow.

There is another thing that I must add. Not about utopia or about pseudo-utopia, about which Mr Bahr spoke. I wish to say that we must concentrate all our attention on nuclear weapons. We also must be concerned with conventional weapons and with the question of alignment of forces. That is, with those problems that have been included on the agenda. What we need is not just general or mutual security, we also need security that also would ensure the security of small or weak countries in relation to the big and strong Soviet Union.

This can be achieved only through talks. Therefore, we are happy that talks are now taking place in Vienna. Of course we need time. By the way, Mr Chairman, there is an old French saying: He who rushes loses time. I think that this is what Federal Chancellor Schmidt had in mind when he said that the second step should not be taken before making the first step.

[Zorin] I think it is very significant that there was some department among our West German friends. It is very typical of the situation that has now developed in the world. A debate is raging, not only in West Germany and the United States; a struggle is being waged. This indicates the difficulty of the problems under discussion and shows both the difficult situation and those difficulties that we are facing.

[Zhurkin] I would like to respond briefly to a number of previous remarks. First to the words of Chancellor Schmidt regarding the PRC: It is apparent that any person who has been there from the West or the East comes away with deep impressions. The energies with which the problems are being solved and the difficulties that China faces make up wish them success in the solution of their problems.

One other thing is worthy of note. China is one of the nuclear powers. I am pleased to note that on a series of very important questions our position coincides with that of China. Take for example the Rarotonga Treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. Who came out in support of this treaty? The Soviet Union and the PRC. Who undertook an obligation not to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons? The PRC and the Soviet Union. I could continue with this list. In general I am in agreement. One must not be locked in only within that circle of problems that we have been discussing. We should also pay attention to the positive processes in other parts of the world.

A brief comment on what Mr Ruehe said. He said that SALT I and SALT II are not that important. How are they not important? Before 1972, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States built a single ICBM silo. [sentence as heard] They were being built for 10 years and then for 15 years they were not built. If it were not for this agreement it would be difficult to estimate what we and the Americans would have built. Therefore, I think that in this context we are quite right to put the question as sharply as we do, about the United States undertaking an inadmissible step in breaching the SALT II treaty and officially stating its intent to do this.

Third, I am in complete agreement with Mr Ruehl. Mr Ruehl and other West German colleagues spoke about this. It is the question of the importance of reduction of conventional, or as they are called, general purpose forces or conventional armed forces, and conventional arms. This is an important question. But I feel that it is necessary somehow to attempt to break away from the frames of traditional dialogue in this sphere. What does the traditional dialogue consist of? The accusation is being made that the Warsaw Pact forces are larger. We are attempting to prove that there is approximate parity. I can give you dozens of quotes and facts that are well known to you. Let us try to approach this from a nontraditional point of view. The Warsaw Pact countries attempted this. It may appeal to you or not. It is a proposal to reduce the numerical strength of the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces by a million as a major but not isolated step. Other such steps are possible. Let us think how to approach these questions in an unconventional way. And, while we are at it, let us consider how to discuss all the existing claims on both sides, because these mutual claims have to be approached with great care. With this I am in agreement.

[Zorin] Mr Chancellor.

[Schmidt] In regard to what you have said, I wish to note the following: I consider it futile to reproach each other about what has already taken place. Today there are no U.S. representatives here. I could say much in their defense. But this is not my task. I am not a defender. But I consider it unnecessary to attack them in their absence. Rather, I would like to say the following: In exactly the same way as we all agreed on, I will say that none of us and none of the great powers, be it the Soviet Union or the United States, can by itself ensure peace or security for itself. We are all dependent on each other and are tied to each other. We also must realize that we are dependent on each other in the economic area as well and that we are tied to each other by culture.

During recent days I have heard much about the common European household. I was somewhat surprised by this. I frequently have been to America and have often encountered anticommunist and anti-Soviet positions there. I have often said: What would your concerts, say in Chicago, or in Pittsburgh, or in Los Angeles be like if there were no Mussorgskiy, Tchaikovskiy, Shostakovich, or Prokofyev?

Today I say: What would Moscow concerts be like if there were no Mozart, Beethoven, Verdi, or Puccini? All of them are the product of a common culture that was created over a period of more than 1,000 years. We depend on one another.

Despite the Nazi period, as a youth I fortunately had the opportunity to read Aleksandr Pushkin, Dostoyevskiy, Ivan Turgenev, Lermontov, Tolstoy, and others. Fortunately, I had the opportunity to read Jack London, Mark Twain, William Faulkner, Saroyan, and others. This is one world, and a certain American who has long been dead spoke about this. His name was Wendell Willkie. He wanted to be president, but he did not make it. He proposed the thesis of one world. This one world will not become any better if one accuses another of making mistakes in 1975, in 1960, or in 1950. All sides made mistakes. The most horrible mistake was made by Hitler. We continue to this day to suffer because of it. But there is no sense in dragging the memory of all these mistakes with us as we try to build the future. I want to say that it is not worth playing ping pong with history.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] I agree with you, Mr Schmidt — we do not need to handle history like ping pong or to play with history. Nonetheless, if in our discussion today incorrect assertions appear, regardless of whether they concern the present or the past, we probably have to react to them or respond. Take for instance Mr Ruehe's remark that talks concluded in the 1970's did not envisage a reduction in arms, but only their limitation.

The SALT II treaty envisaged a reduction of strategic arms by 10 percent, and this is not a small figure. If the SALT III treaty had been worked out, as was envisaged, then the reduction would have been far more significant and much broader.

As far as conventional arms are concerned, permit me to recall a German saying: The neighbor's hen always looks like a goose. [laughter] That is why....

[Schmidt interrupts in German without translation] A German or Russian saying? [laughter]

[Falin] German. These conventional armed forces of ours seem different than similar armed forces that you have. This depends, as Albert Einstein said, on which theory you rely on. This wise man, who is respected in our country, said that what a man sees or does not see depends on the theory that man follows. We want to see everything as it is. Just 2 years ago General Secretary Gorbachev proposed: Please, if you consider that we have more armaments in some area of conventional arms than you have, let us sit down at the table and discuss it. We are prepared to make reductions. But we proceed from the premise that you will be ready to reduce those arms in which you have more weapons systems than we have.

Two years have passed and there has been no reaction. This means that either you are not too concerned by a real imbalance [pereves], as you say, or there is no imbalance. Either one or the other. Let us nevertheless get on with business. It is business, not propaganda about business or talk about business, that will lead us to better security. Even if we deny, even if we come out against the simple fact that today, particularly in Europe, there cannot be two securities, one better for us and worse for you or vice versa, we will not annul this truism.

There can be only one security for all of us, a good one that is better for us all, or a worse one, insofar as we cannot fight in Europe. Europe has had its fill of fighting [otvoyevalas], once and for all. It has had its fill of the use of nuclear weapons -- fortunately it was never used here -- and of the use of conventional weapons.

So let us take this fact as a starting point, and springing from it solve all the questions, even those that seem today to be utopian to you.

[Zorin] Mr Ruehe.

[Ruehe] I think that there is complete unity among all Europeans insofar as nobody has as much experience with war as the Europeans. The policy that guides us says no to war and yes to freedom so that the states and societies can develop according to their wishes in peaceful competition with one another. This is why arms limitation is also essential in the area of conventional arms, and the abolition of borders is essential in the area of culture and science.

What Helmut Schmidt said here is of very great importance, but he spoke more about the past. But even today there are many wonderful musicians, writers both in the Soviet

Union and in Western Europe, who could mutually enrich us. If the hearts of people have a clear idea of people on the other side, this will make war impossible. This is why, if we are defense experts, we should take these matters into consideration, too. This also concerns our viewers. If they could read books, if they could follow such interesting discussions on television, and so forth, then this would be an important contribution to the cause of peace and cooperation in Europe.

[Bahr] I spoke about utopias and about the need to have prospects. Now I would like to talk about the need for consistency of steps. Security comes first. If this is clear, then the economy, and so forth — and why is clear to all of us — all these questions will be easier to solve.

[Falin] If I could have a minute please. I think that Mr Schmidt, who has known me for many years, and the other colleagues present here from the FRG will believe me. No one is more outspoken in favor of development of cultural contacts than the Soviet people. Cultural, not pseudocultural. There is not a single state in which books by foreign authors are printed in such large print runs as in the Soviet Union. There is not a single country in which foreign plays are staged as frequently as here. Nor is there a place where foreign films — perhaps there are more American films shown in your country than here — are shown more frequently than in the Soviet Union. But the question is not what it would appear to be from your words — that we intend to divorce ourselves from the culture of other countries. That is not the case. But I fully concur with the words of Mr Bahr. Culture alone will not preserve or distance us from the threat of war. It is an important element, but only an element. The basis of everything today is, unfortunately, security.

[Zorin] Our time on the air is coming to an end. In conclusion I would like to say that we have mentioned several times today the term Europe, the common household. I think it would be more accurate to say that Europe is but a floor in a common household. Our earth has become very small and we Europeans can lay claim to no more than one floor. In relation to this, I want to pose a question to you. What can we do -- I would like all of you to very briefly formulate an answer — what can Europe do to make our small planet, our world more secure than it is today? We will begin with you, Mr Ruehl, although I understand that by the nature of your work it is more difficult for you to answer this question.

[Ruehl] Not in the least.

[Zorin] I am very pleased to hear this.

[Ruehl] We must calmly, in a businesslike manner, with patience, but without drawing it out, discuss our differences, as I already have said. Then it will be possible to solve all the problems.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] I think that we must, above all, humanize political relations, in the sense of identifying that common denominator present in all our problems, despite apparent differences. If we do not solve the problems, nobody will solve them for us. If we do solve the problems on a mutually acceptable basis, we will solve this problem for each of us and for all of us together.

[Zorin] Mr Bahr.

[Bahr] I would like to start with the next practical step. That is to determine how the result of the elimination of conventional weapons should look and later to determine the steps to this disarmament. These are European matters. Here we can do more than in the area of space or strategic arms.

[Zorin] Mr Ruehe.

[Ruehe] The political division of the world runs through Europe -- through my country, Germany. From here a special responsibility befalls us. If we can eliminate tension here, if we can build bridges across European borders, then we will have achieved something good not only for Europe, but for the whole world.

[Zorin] Professor Zhurkin.

[Zhurkin] I think what is most important is to constantly strive to understand each other, to understand the concerns and anxieties and the aspirations and hopes of the other side -- not only to understand, but to try to solve these problems jointly.

[Zorin] Chancellor Schmidt.

[Schmidt] Part of our discussion today was concerned with the fact that there are many people on both sides who are afraid of the other side. One of the most important tasks is to avoid fanning the fears in each other; that we not accuse one another without foundation; that we attempt to trust each other. Personally, I can say in all honesty that I believe in Gorbachev's aspiration for peace. It is necessary that people do not cheat each other; that they should not disappoint each other; that people should openly discuss their problems as we have today, even if they adhere to totally different points of view. The more frequent and the more open are the discussions of this sort, not only on your television but on ours as well, the better it is.

The more often people speak to each other, and that includes the common people unhindered by any political responsibility, the better it is, the less fear there will be. The less fear there is, the easier it is for political figures to strive to conclude agreements.

[Zorin] The time for our broadcast has come to an end. There are many more problems we could have discussed. Today different opinions about the problems discussed were voiced. This is quite natural. I feel that what is more important and significant than these differences of opinions are two circumstances. The first is that this talk, this exchange of views that occurred today, has become possible. I think that not so long ago this would have been unlikely and difficult to bring about. Second, that despite the differences of opinions expressed today on various positions, the participants in the discussion expressed a general concern, a general aspiration by joint means to find a path to peace, to the strengthening of peace.

It is left for me to thank you for participating in our talk, to thank our viewers for their attention. Until we meet again here in our Studio 9, thank you.

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CSO: 5200/1403

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE IN BONN: INF DEAL ONLY 'FIRST STEP'

LD101600 Hamburg DPA in German 1223 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Bonn, (DPA) — The Soviet Union is making efforts at all levels to counter fears in the West that a "zero option" for medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe could conjure up military dangers on account of Soviet superiority in other spheres. Major General Konstantin Cheremukhin, military attache at the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, speaking to journalists on Friday, stressed the fact that the elimination of medium-range missiles proposed by Moscow should only be a first stage. Immediately after the signing of a medium-range agreement, negotiations should be initiated with the aim of also "liquidating" missiles of shorter range, and also of reducing conventional weapons.

Cheremukhin regretted that the proposal for a "zero option" had not met with the necessary response in the West as far as missiles of shorter range were concerned, and that the heads of the Bonn Defense Ministry had come out resolutely against it. He accused the United States of making the sought after agreement on medium-range weapons more difficult by linking it with the issue of short-range missiles and also with that of chemical weapons.

The military attache was commenting in the Soviet Embassy on the occasion of the presentation of the German edition of a Moscow publication on U.S. weapons. The report, entitled "From whence the Threat to Peace?", is a sort of riposte to the annual report of the U.S. Defense Department on the military strength of the USSR. As opposed to the U.S. figures, according to which there is a Soviet superiority, it is shown in the Moscow book that there is something approaching a military equilibrium between NATO and Warsaw Pact both in the nuclear and conventional fields. The United States is accused of striving for world dominance and is given sole blame for the arms spiral since the end of World War II.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA REPORTS ON FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY CONGRESS

Disagreements Over INF

PM061147 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Bolshakov dispatch: "At the Socialists' Congress"]

[Text] Lille, 3 Apr -- The French Socialist Party's [PS] National Congress, attended by about 5,000 delegates and guests, opened in Lille today.

It is being held under conditions when the PS is no longer the ruling party, having lost power to the right wing at the last parliamentary elections, and when the bloc of left-wing forces no longer exists, a bloc which, as the French Communists noted, fell apart through the fault of the Socialists, who were making more and more concessions to the demands of big capital. Actually, on coming to power in March last year, the right wing did not gain complete power -- F. Mitterrand remains president of the republic until 1988, having been elected to that post by the PS.

The election defeat led to serious disorder within the PS. This was aggravated by the practice of "cohabitation" between the Socialist president and the right-wing government. The party's right wing headed by M. Rocard gained strength, and its supporters are now advocating an alliance with the centrists from the Union for French Democracy bloc of right-wing parties and the nomination of M. Rocard as the PS candidate for the next presidential elections. The factional struggle over the presidential candidate has particularly exacerbated the situation within the party at present. According to the latest public opinion polls, President F. Mitterrand enjoys the support of the majority of French people, up to 55 percent. His supporters, advocating Mitterrand's nomination as candidate for another term even though the president has up to now not officially given his consent, declare that should he do so Rocard would "have to withdraw his candidacy."

There are strong differences within the party ranks on international problems, especially France's approach to the problem of disarmament and the new Soviet initiative on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. A number of PS leaders, in particular First Secretary L. Jospin and former French Prime Minister L. Fabius, have recently expressed doubts regarding, for example, the advisability of continuing French nuclear tests. Left-wing socialists expressed support for a medium-range missile agreement under the slogan "Neither SS-20's nor Pershings!"

But the right wing holds virtually the same positions as the Chirac cabinet -- in favor of continuing the arms race and nuclear tests and the production of new types of nuclear and chemical weapons and against the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. In fact, there are virtually no differences between F. Mitterrand and J. Chirac on the question of French policy in the disarmament sphere.

The discussion of these questions, as well as problems of the country's socioeconomic situation and, in particular, unemployment and the decline of the population's purchasing power, will be the topics of debate at the congress.

Foreign delegations also are taking part in the forum of French socialists, including a CPSU delegation headed by V.V. Chikin, chief editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

'Progress' on Nuclear Policy

PM071621 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 87 First Edition p 6

[Own correspondent V. Bolshakov dispatch: "Congress Over"]

[Text] Lille, 5 Apr -- The Socialist Party national congress has concluded its work here. The party's leading organs have been elected, and L. Jospin has again become the first secretary. The concluding report, which he delivered today, the resolutions on the results of the work of the sections which discussed questions of French policy -- both domestic and foreign -- and the final "orientation document" define the main directions of the party's preparations for the 1988 presidential election.

In the domestic policy sphere the Socialists, as always, propose a program of change which does not affect the foundations of the capitalist system. Nevertheless, there is also much in this program that is attractive to the ordinary voter -- the widening of social programs, the slogan of creating new jobs, and so forth.

Definite progress has become apparent in the foreign policy area. The congress welcomed the broader cooperation with the socialist countries' ruling communist parties, primarily the CPSU, and recommended continued support for this cooperation and its wider range. The Socialists in fact advocated preserving France's nuclear potential, but within the limits necessary for defense. They dissociated themselves from the arms race program proclaimed by J. Chirac's government. A number of speakers voiced support for the USSR's peace initiatives, particularly M.S. Gorbachev's proposals to eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe.

On the whole, the congress documents are very vague in nature, because they are the result of a very shaky compromise among different factions which even at the congress waged a struggle for leadership of the party and for the nomination of their "own people" for party posts.

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CSO: 5200/1403

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL ADOPTS INF RESOLUTION

LD091357 Moscow TASS in English 1012 GMT 9 Apr 87

[Text] Rome April 9 TASS -- The Socialist International's council at a session under way in Rome has adopted a resolution on disarmament, urging the Soviet Union and the United States "to conclude a separate agreement on medium-range nuclear forces, based on the zero option in Europe".

It rejected "all new preconditions from any country concerned, including European countries, for the conclusion of a separate INF (intermediate nuclear force) agreement".

The resolution continued: "The elimination of medium-range nuclear forces in Europe should not be used as a pretext or an instrument to install new kinds of shorter-range nuclear systems.

"After the conclusion of an INF agreement, it is also necessary to start negotiations on reducing shorter-range nuclear systems deployed in Europe.

"The problem of imbalance in the shorter-range nuclear systems (SRINF) and conventional capabilities must be solved in the near future."

The document also called for refraining "from developing, testing and deploying new anti-missile and space weapons".

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET COLONEL ON U.S. NUCLEAR FORCE IN KOREA

SK060403 Moscow International Service in Korean 0930 GMT 3 Apr 87

[Talk by station military commentator Colonel (Eduard Asatov): "Asia Should Not Become the Theater of a Nuclear War" — recorded in Russian fading into Korean translation"]

[Text] Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Bikini are well known to the world. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were victims of U.S. atomic bombings, and Bikini is a U.S. nuclear test site where 68 nuclear explosions have taken place over the past 4 years. Korea and Vietnam were supposed to suffer from fate. The United States was planning to do something against these two Asian peoples.

Catastrophic consequences of the nuclear explosions are still conspicuous. The names of the Japanese people burnt to death by nuclear explosions or dead of radioactivity are remembered not only by their families and relatives. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were revived, thanks to those who rebuilt them. However, Bikini and many other islands have been reduced to desert islands. It is dangerous to live in a land contaminated by radioactivity. Therefore, people cannot live there. Radioactive fallout fell over 7,000 square kilometers of ocean surface. Water and air contaminated by nuclear explosions in Bikini have been detected as far as 2,000 km away, at the entrance to the United States' designated restricted area. Many consequences that arise from such tests can be prevented, but happened anyway as a result of the tests.

No one dares to imagine what would be the result if some of the 1,000 U.S. nuclear bombs currently deployed in South Korea were used. It is not important to talk about where the explosions will take place and where mushroom clouds will occur -- the North or the South of Korea, because the entire Korean Peninsula would suffer damage from these explosions. Calculations show that the density of deployment of U.S. nuclear bombs in South Korea is higher than in Western Europe. However, the possibility of abolishing U.S. nuclear missiles is increasing. Their abolition will not be realized as we wish, and all the missiles cannot be removed at the same time, but the possibility is increasing.

The situation in Korea is different from that in Europe. The Pershing-2, U.S. missiles whose fate is being discussed at talks in Europe, is scheduled to be introduced into Korea under the pretext of modernizing U.S. forces. Also, it is foreseen that prior to this, U.S. Lance missiles will be introduced to arm the South Korean Army. Lance missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

In an interview by a WASHINGTON POST reporter, General Livsey, commander of the U.S.-South Korean combined forces, stated that Americans should possess a certain number of long-range weapons. Does this mean that these weapons are less dangerous to the Korean people than to the Europeans? No, it does not.

A nuclear explosion means (?indiscretion) both in Europe and Asia. A nuclear explosion can be more dangerous in Asia, because of the denser population in this area. Also because the [passage indistinct] of missiles in Europe has been created. The Soviet Union has deployed 355 missiles to counter 1,380 U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. This plays the role of cooling the heads of bellicose NATO elements who like to set nuclear weapons in motion.

However, what can happen in Asia? The appearance of U.S. medium-range missiles will bring about a notable change in the strategic situation in the Far East. Thus, the situation will become more unstable.

The range of a Pershing-2 missile is 2,500 km. People's Korea, China, and a vast area of the Soviet Far East are within this range. Also, the Indochinese countries are within this range. The socialist countries cannot but take this fact into account when they organize the defense of their territories.

Experience in Europe shows that the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles tempted NATO generals to view Europe as a site of military action. Where is the guarantee that there will be no such dangerous ambition in the U.S.-South Korean combined forces command? Furthermore, the war fever of this command has very frequently and aggressively surfaced. This is shown by "Team Spirit-87," the ongoing large-scale U.S.-South Korean military exercise.

The Soviet people, who lost approximately 20 million sons and daughters during World War II overflow with resolve to prevent nuclear calamities. They have proposed abolishing nuclear weapons on earth by 2000. China, another power in Asia with the Soviet Union, assumes the obligation of not using nuclear weapons first. People's Korea has proposed that the Korean Peninsula be turned into a nuclear-free zone. This is the only way to prevent the occurrence of an even more horrendous tragedy than Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Asia. Only joint efforts can help to prevent Asia from being reduced to an area like Bikini which has been turned into a desert area due to radioactivity.

The Asian people want their continent to be peaceful and prosperous. They do not want it to become a site for military action filled with nuclear weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1403

PORTUGUESE SEE GORBACHEV AS INTENT ON DIVIDING WEST

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 5 Mar 1987 p 6

[Excerpt] There is no question that Gorbachev is counting on the advantage of surprise. Since he is certain of the cohesiveness of the geostrategic bloc over which he rules, the new tenant in the Kremlin wants to keep forcing events before his freedom of action is reduced, whether internally or externally. Day after day, his proposals come forth at an accelerated pace, leaving his adversaries with no time to prepare punctual responses..., and so he is concentrating on proposals about external politics. First, he shows signs of wanting to get out of Afghanistan, even though he has said nothing that is either specific or practical. Then, he sends to the US government a proposed solution to the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe; in the proposal he states a condition that this issue be dealt with separately from others having to do with disarmament, and in particular from the star wars plan. Does this represent a Soviet retreat? Not really. For now, we are only dealing with a suggestion that coincides with the "zero option" proposed by the Americans in 1981; that proposal foresaw the simultaneous withdrawal of the Russian SS-20's and the American cruise and Pershing II missiles, and left the White House little room for outright refusal.

It is quite surprising that Gorbachev has so quickly agreed to separate this question from the star wars issue; it contradicts his position last October at Reykjavik when he met with a Reagan who appeared disposed to grant almost anything in order to strike an agreement with the USSR that would allow him to end his presidency with glory. But if the Russians had accepted the Iceland proposals immediately, before starting the internal reforms which have begun since then, they would have been placed in a weakened negotiating position. So, they preferred to wait a bit, and while they waited many things happened that fit nicely with their clear interest in finding a smooth road to a nuclear pact that would relieve them of a nuclear preparedness burden that is doing irreparable damage to their economic situation. There was the scandal of a mercenary American caught in Nicaragua; there was Irangate; and, above all, there were the more or less open admissions that star wars might be delayed. So, if last October Reagan wanted an agreement that would ratify his second term--an agreement, let's say, for history--right now, the North American president, besides not having any strong counter-arguments, is in a situation that makes him want an agreement that will cause people to forget the viscissitudes that have recently beset him. And, what Gorbachev is

offering is basically the best that Reagan could expect, since it allows him to present himself as someone who found common cause with his adversary without giving up anything of substance.

The conditions have thereby been set for an agreement which, whatever else may be its consequences, may have an impact upon the traditional European geostrategic positions. And it is not surprising that here in the Old World exist the greatest apprehensions about such an agreement. Because the fact is that, if the dismantling of the medium-range missiles is important to a reduction of tension between the two superpowers, the same cannot be said of the security of Western Europe; yes, it will be facing an Eastern bloc that has no SS-20's, but also one that has great conventional military power, and a degree of cohesiveness and mobilization that is immensely superior to its own. Wasn't it, after all, this superiority that caused the European powers to unite in nuclearization in the first place?

What is to be feared, when all is said and done, is that the United States will progressively retreat from its defense commitments on the European continent. This is not too unlikely, after all, as is demonstrated by the positions taken by several congressmen who, sometimes in economic terms, sometimes in political terms, argue against those countries that have been reluctant to collaborate with the United States. Also, once the cohesiveness at the core of the NATO alliance becomes attenuated, there will be no lack of individual national attitudes with regard to negotiations of their own security vis-a-vis the USSR.

Right now, these possibilities seem remote, as witness the positive response from the White House regarding inclusion of short-range missiles in the agreement; this is a nod in the direction of Europe's concerns. But the fact is that the conditions have been created for changes that are going to be surprising to much of Western Europe. And, for now, the Europeans are confronting a situation in which their security is going to be debated with no participation on their part in the debate. The Soviet web, which has never hidden its aim of creating a split in the Western camp, continues to be woven, even when its advances appear to be dictated by a position of weakness.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ANALYSIS OF NEW SOVIET ARMS PROPOSALS

OW111828 Beijing XINHUA in English 1808 GMT 11 Apr 87

["News Analysis: Soviet New Proposals Aim at Western Europe (by Xia Zhimian)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Bonn, April 10 (XINHUA) -- Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev today unleashed a set of proposals on reducing short-range missiles in Europe in a bid to quell the West European concern over Soviet superiority in conventional and tactical nuclear forces.

The Gorbachev offer, spelled out at a Prague rally, is made of two parts. One calls for immediate negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union on eliminating short-range missiles (with ranges between 500 to 1,000 kilometers) stationed in Europe. Neither side will be allowed to deploy more short-range missiles during the negotiation.

The other part suggests that the foreign ministers of countries involved in the Vienna European Security Conference meet to start negotiation on reducing shorter-range nuclear weapons (with ranges between 150 and 500 kilometers) and conventional armaments.

Gorbachev said the Soviet Union is willing to discuss the conventional military imbalance in Europe.

While proposing negotiation between Washington and Moscow, Gorbachev today invited the Paris, London and Bonn governments to contribute to the "freedom of Europe from medium-range missiles."

The Soviet leader's proposals followed closely his call on February 28 to reach a separate agreement with the United States on eliminating their intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in Europe.

Gorbachev's February proposal reversed his previous insistence on linking INF with long-range missiles and especially the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and accepted the West-sponsored "zero option" -- pulling U.S. Pershing-IIs and cruise missiles in return for the Soviet withdrawal of SS-20s.

It was apparently aimed at putting more pressure on the Reagan administration and forcing it to abandon the SDI by catering to the disarmament needs of the West European countries and the Americans as well.

At first sight, the West European countries did greet favorably the Soviet INF proposal and expected the advent of an important breakthrough in the nuclear arms negotiation.

But soon the West Europeans began to worry as they realized that once the medium-range missiles are eliminated, the Soviets will have great superiority in tactical nuclear forces. Therefore, they proposed that the question of medium-range missiles be linked with that of short-range ones.

The West European concern was well expressed during British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to Moscow and French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac's trip to Washington. The call for not neglecting Soviet superiority in short-range missiles is also louder in Federal Germany, which has energetically advocated a U.S.-Soviet INF agreement based on the "zero option."

Obviously, the first part of Gorbachev's proposal today, which is in nature a "zero option" on short-range missiles, aims to ease the concern of the West Europeans in this respect.

However, Western Europe has all along opposed the complete "denuclearization" of Europe since it believes that nuclear weapons can somehow offset the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional weaponry.

Ten days ago, Federal German Deputy Defense Ministry Lothar Ruhl said Western Europe cannot afford one "zero option" after another which will derive it of the only means to balance with the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional weaponry.

Reports said Federal German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in his recent letter to U.S. President Ronald Reagan, also stressed the need to keep short-range and tactical nuclear forces.

Thus, Gorbachev tries to dispel the Western Europeans' suspicion on its short-range missile proposal by suggesting that the Soviet Union would like to discuss any possible imbalance of conventional armed forces in Europe.

But, easier said than done. At the European disarmament conference, the NATO and the Warsaw Pact have negotiated conventional forces for 14 years and no substantial results have been achieved.

Reactions towards the Soviet latest proposal are different. Some extended welcome while others said they need further study.

It is still too early to predict what will happen in the months to come and whether Moscow will achieve its goal.

But one thing is certain: The parties concerned will have a hard bargaining over the Soviet proposal.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BEIJING COMMENTARY ON SHULTZ' MOSCOW VISIT

OW121021 Beijing in English to North American 0000 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Zhang Gouhua commentary]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz will visit Moscow on Monday to hold political talks with Soviet leaders. Our Washington correspondent Zhang Gouhua has a new analysis:

[Beging Zhang recording] Secretary of State George Shultz's talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow will mark the third high-level contact between U.S. and Soviet officials since the Iceland summit last October, and medium-range missiles are expected to be a major topic of their discussion, although the talks are also expected to cover regional issues, human rights, and embassy security.

U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations have been going off and on for many years, and one area where breakthrough is least difficult is the reduction or elimination of medium-range missiles. It was the Iceland summit that brought the U.S.-Soviet position on medium-range missile reduction closer, and it was Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's new proposal of 28 February to separate medium-range missile talks from space weapons negotiations that made the prospect of a treaty on reducing or eliminating medium-range missiles look good.

However, prospect is one thing, reality is another. When the extended session of U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range missiles ended in Geneva on 26 March, positions of the two countries were still far apart. Differences are many: On verification, and on where to deploy the 100 medium-range missiles each side is allowed to retain after the elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe.

But the biggest stumbling block centers on short-range missiles, an area where the United States wants to have a right to match current Soviet (?absolute) superiority. Some Soviet officials have hinted in the past few days at a possible breakthrough by agreeing to eliminate some or all of their short-range missiles in Europe. They have also hinted at agreeing to dismantle all of their medium-range missiles, including the 100 each side first wanted to retain. U.S. officials said they have not received any formal Soviet proposals yet, and Secretary Shultz goes to Moscow to discuss the possibility with Soviet leaders.

Circumstances at home and abroad are such that both the United States and the Soviet Union do want a breakthrough or at least some progress in their lengthy arms control

negotiation, but when both sides come to the bargaining table, each wants to circumvent the other. Bargaining is hard however good the prospect is.

One other thing noted is that Secretary of State George Shultz embarks on his Moscow visit at a time when both sides are stepping up accusing each other of security breaches at each other's embassy. While George Shultz described Soviet penetration into the U.S. Embassy in Moscow as casting a heavy shadow on talks with Soviet leaders, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy charged that the U.S. allegations are aimed at poisoning the atmosphere before Shultz's visit. Therefore, how successful Shultz's talks with Shevardnadze will remain to be seen. [end recording]

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ANALYSIS OF SHULTZ' VISIT TO MOSCOW

OW131532 Beijing XINHUA in English 1458 GMT 12 Apr 87

["News Analysis: Shultz's Moscow Visit (by Shi Lujia)"]--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, 12 Apr (XINHUA)--On the eve of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's Moscow visit, a message came from the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that negotiations on short-range missiles to be run concurrently with the talks on intermediate nuclear force (INF) in Europe. [sentence as received]

This represents a reverse of the Soviet leader's original stand that talks on short-range weapons follow those on medium-range missiles.

While in Prague, Gorbachev proposed that talks be held within the framework of the European Security Conference for drastic cuts in tactical missiles and conventional forces in Europe.

Gorbachev's new overtures were given a reserved welcome by U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who said: "We have never believed in the linkage of those two weapon systems together, but we have believed that the negotiations should be simultaneous."

However, he made clear that the United States will not permit the benefit of INF reduction "to be undermined and circumvented by continuing imbalance" in short-range missiles, in which he said Moscow has "a huge advantage."

The recent pronouncements by both sides rendered more subtle the prospects of Euromissile negotiations which had been bogged down over a U.S. demand that short-range missiles be addressed as integral part of the INF negotiations.

In February, the Soviet Union declared a linkage of the Euromissile issue with the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in arms control talks, thus receiving the long-stalled medium-range missile talks, with both sides accepting the "zero option" as the starting point to solve the Euromissile issue. The two sides also came closer on the issue of verification.

All this created a very optimistic climate at the time, with officials of both sides predicting a Euromissile accord in a matter of months. Local newspapers

in this capital said that Shultz's Moscow visit, if successful, would clear the way for a visit by Soviet leader Gorbachev to Washington within this year.

However, the talks were soon brought to a halt because of a draft treaty put forward by the United States urging a simultaneous resolution of both medium and short-range missiles in Europe.

The United States argued that the withdrawal of U.S. Pershing-II and Cruise missiles from Europe, in line with the "zero option," would expose Europe to the grave threat of several hundred Soviet short-range rockets.

Therefore, the United States demanded that the Soviet Union reduce its short-range missiles in Europe, and at the same time allow the United States to station the same number of such weapons in Europe.

In response, the Soviet Union expressed opposition to the simultaneous talks on these two kinds of weapons and the introduction of new U.S. missiles in Europe though it was willing to negotiate the short-range missile issue.

This new strategy of the United States, the Soviet Union believes, is a proof that it is not disposed virtually to dismantle Euromissiles.

Why this U.S. emphasis on short-range missiles when breakthroughs are in sight at medium-range missile talks?

Domestically, although public opinion is generally in favor of a Euromissile accord, some people like Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke out against the "zero option," and instead called on the United States to keep a portion of its missiles there as a deterrent to Soviet short-range rockets and conventional arms.

Internationally, most of the Western European nations, favoring a Euromissile solution as they are, have misgivings about the Soviet superiority in short-range missiles and conventional forces. Hence, their hope for a simultaneous resolution of both.

With this in mind, French Prime Minister Francois Mitterrand and NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington visited the United States recently to extort a pledge to this effect. This was followed by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who travelled to Moscow to press Gorbachev to comply with the U.S. demand.

On the other side of the coin, however, it is also Reagan's desire to work out a Euromissile accord with the Soviet Union, because:

In the short term, such an accord would serve to improve the image of his administration, thus pushing the Iran-Contra scandal into the background; in the longer term, any progress in arms cuts achieved during what is left of his second term would be of advantage to both Reagan himself and the Republican Party he represents.

Secondly, Euromissiles do not count so much as the U.S. strategic and space weaponry do in the overall balance of nuclear arsenals with the Soviet Union, and the taking-out of Euromissiles will not upset their nuclear parity.

This explains why President Reagan has okayed Shultz's Moscow visit as planned despite the recent uproar in this capital over the Soviet spying on U.S. Embassy personnel in Moscow.

U.S. Presidential National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci indicated that Reagan saw the visit as worthwhile in view of the vital significance inherent in the issues to be discussed, although the time is inopportune.

But the chances for major breakthroughs in talks over Europe's medium and short-range missiles seem slim during Shultz's visit, in view of the differences separating the two sides and their limited maneuvering room caused by domestic and international factors.

Nevertheless, given the mutual desire to seek common grounds towards such an accord, the visit offers each side a chance to feel the other out, thus paving the way for future negotiations.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

TASS ON TOMAHAWK TEST--San Francisco April 2 TASS--The United States has conducted another Tomahawk cruise missile test. The ASSOCIATED PRESS reported today, quoting a spokesman for the U.S. Navy, that the missile had been launched from a U.S. warship in the Pacific. The cruise test was carried out by the Pentagon with a view to perfecting long-range weapon systems that might be used for strategic and tactical purposes and was an integral part of the U.S. military buildup programme. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1033 GMT 2 Apr 87 LD]

OBUKHOV RECEIVES WOMEN'S GROUP--Geneva March 25 TASS--Aleksey Obukhov, deputy head of the Soviet delegation to the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms at Geneva, today received a delegation of the special committee of non-governmental organizations on disarmament led by its president Edit Ballantyne who is also secretary-general of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. During the meeting Obukhov told the delegation about the guidelines of the Soviet policy on arms control and disarmament and cited examples of a new thinking and new approaches demonstrated by the Soviet side. The Soviet representative informed the delegation about the state of affairs at the talks on nuclear and space arms. He put special emphasis on the need for solving the problem of elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe in the light of the new Soviet initiative set forth by Mikhail Gorbachev in his February 28, 1987 statement. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1912 GMT 25 Mar 87 LD]

TASS NOTES MITTERRAND-KOHL EXCHANGE--Paris, 29 Mar--The proposal by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe was at the center of attention during talks between French President Francois Mitterrand and FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl. As H. Kohl told journalists after the meeting, "Paris and Bonn seek disarmament and detente, but on the condition of proper verification [kontrol]." Nonetheless, as is clear from the statements by the participants in the talks, France and the FRG intend to continue the arms buildup. [TASS report: "Hiding Behind Reservations"] [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 3 PM]

TASS CITES JAPANESE STATEMENT--Tokyo, 9 Apr (TASS)--Today a representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry voiced support for a complete elimination of nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe. Asked by TASS correspondent Aleksandr Anichkin at a regular briefing held at the Foreign Ministry today, he said that Japan's position was to liquidate fully missiles also in Asia. At the same time Japan considers acceptable the version "zero missiles in Europe, 100 in Asia." The Foreign Ministry representative pointed out that Tokyo was engaged in intensive consultations with Washington on this issue. Edward Rawnny, special adviser of the President and the U.S. state secretary of arms reduction talks, visited Japan five times in the past 12 months to agree the positions of the two countries. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1554 GMT 9 Apr 87] /9599

CSO: 5200/1421

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: REPORTS, COMMENTS ON END OF VIENNA CSCE SECOND ROUND

U.S., NATO Show No Initiative

LD050100 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 4 Apr 87

[Text] In Vienna a meeting is underway of delegates of the countries involved in the Helsinki process. Viktor Glazunov reports: All aspects of international cooperation are important to Europe and the rest of the world. Over the past 10 years it has become clear that the European process of normalizing relations has no prospects without the easing of military tensions. It is with respect to military issues that the United States and other NATO countries are showing no initiative at the Vienna meeting, which arouses suspicions. They have not made a single proposal for reducing military confrontation in Europe so far. Nor have they responded in definite terms to the clear-cut proposal of the Warsaw Treaty organization for opening talks on substantial reductions of armed forces and conventional arms on the entire European Continent, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

A number of unofficial consultations have taken place in Vienna lately between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. One would like to believe that, as a result, some progress will be made. But the indications are that the United States and its allies want to confine themselves to discussing what they term an imbalance of strength. The socialist countries are calling for radical reductions of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. Unlike NATO, they want all the 35 nations taking part in the Helsinki process to discuss these issues, rather than confine the discussions to members of the military alliances.

The chief Soviet delegate to the Vienna meeting, Dr Kashlev, said that the legitimate interests of the neutral and nonaligned nations cannot be ignored in the concepts [as heard] of European security. There has been broad support for Poland's proposal for supplementing the mandate of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament with the right to consider the issue of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons on the entire European Continent. The participants in the conference were greatly impressed with the statement the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made during the visit to the USSR by the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. The Soviet leader said that armaments should be reduced to levels of reasonable sufficiency, that is to levels that suffice to fulfill defensive tasks alone. In the European house every apartment has [the] right to defend itself against burglars, but in a way that will not destroy a neighboring one.

Kashlev Speaks at Session

LD101830 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1300 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Vienna April 10 (TASS) -- The second round of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states participating in the CSCE has closed here today. During 2 and 1/2 months, delegates from 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada were discussing proposals related to different aspects of European security and the promotion of cooperation in the economy, science, technology, environmental protection, and humanitarian affairs.

A large number of the proposals that delegations submitted on these issues -- over 130 -- are appraised here as evidence of the mounting interest of states in advancing the CSCE process.

The leader of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Yu.B. Kashlev, said in his speech that the Soviet stand in Vienna was inseparable from the radical changes taking place in the Soviet Union. The new thinking, which is at the core of restructuring in the USSR, is manifest in the Soviet Union's approach to international relations.

The period that has elapsed has been marked by our great new peace initiatives. Suffice it to remind one of the Soviet proposal that Europe be freed from medium-range missiles. The East-West political dialogue has become deeper, more dynamic, and franker.

The Soviet representative made a number of critical remarks about U.S. policy on nuclear disarmament issues and noted that this policy, which is supported by a number of other NATO countries, is having a negative effect on the discussion of security issues at the Vienna meeting. He noted that unlike the socialist countries, which have more than 10 proposals related to the military aspects of European security in Vienna, the NATO countries totally ignored military problems and did not table a single proposal on them.

At the final plenary meeting, there was talk of the fact that the second round of the Vienna meeting saw the beginning of new consultations between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO on conventional armaments and armed forces. This is a positive development if the consultations lead to substantive talks on disarmament in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The future talks, however, should be conducted on an all-European basis, with the participation of all 35 CSCE states, and no attempt should be made to substitute arithmetic exercises on "imbalances" and the flawed presumption of "the overwhelming military superiority of the Warsaw Pact" for real disarmament.

Dwelling on the problems of human rights and humanitarian cooperation, Yu.B. Kashlev recalled that the USSR in conjunction with other socialist countries put forward in Vienna a series of major initiatives directed at improving the living conditions of millions of working people in the CSCE countries and at the adoption of effective measures to combat such social ailments as unemployment, homelessness, illiteracy, discrimination against women, and so forth.

He called on Western countries to give serious consideration to the proposal that a conference be convened in Moscow on the whole complex of problems concerning humanitarian cooperation.

Kashlev Briefs Journalists

LD141750 Moscow TASS in English 1727 GMT 14 Apr 87

["At Press Centre of USSR Foreign Ministry" — TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow April 14 TASS -- Socialist countries submitted to the European Conference in Vienna a number of proposals on various aspects of the consolidation of security in Europe, head of the Soviet delegation to the meeting, Ambassador Yuriy Kashlev said at a briefing in the press centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry. That Western countries have not submitted a single proposal on the subjects gives ground for concern, he said. We see in this the continuation of the line at the deformation of the European process, the intention to remove from it the military and political themes and to leave only human rights, emigration, and so on, as certain persons would like.

As concerns commercial and economic, scientific and technological, ecological and other matters, the situation at the Vienna meeting is normal. In these areas there is a basis for certain good decisions.

There is a great number of various proposals, perhaps more than 50 on human rights and humanitarian matters. There are proposals with such elements that can be accepted by all the parties. There are proposals so maximalistic as to present difficulty for the other side.

But the Soviet proposals to convene in Moscow a conference on the development of humanitarian cooperation remain in the focus. A number of countries have already expressed a positive attitude to this conference in Moscow.

Some countries, mainly from NATO, have not yet given answer.

The idea of creating in Europe a certain new mechanism of control over the exercise of human rights in various countries is advanced in the proposals of a number of Western countries. On the whole this proposal has some elements which deserve to be pondered on, but there are also such elements that are obviously propaganda gimmicks.

The new moment at this stage of the Vienna meeting, Yuriy Kashlev said, was that new consultations were started between the seven Warsaw Treaty countries and the 16 NATO countries. As is known, the Warsaw Treaty countries came out last year with the Budapest Address in which they proposed to start large-scale talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The NATO countries have accepted these proposals with a large delay and the consultations have started now. They are quite interesting and useful. Serious differences remain, though. The aim of the socialist countries is a substantial, stage-by-stage reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, but the NATO side does not talk of reductions as yet. It talks about the elimination of "disbalance" and not necessarily through reductions, but maybe through build-up. Another discrepancy in the views is that the socialist countries hold that these new talks on conventional armaments and armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals must be conducted by all the 35 countries participating in the European process. Meanwhile, NATO holds that they should be conducted only by representatives of the two blocs. So far the sake of speeding up we have started consultations with them but we envisage that the talks will be conducted among 35 countries, not between the blocs.

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WARSAW PACT PROPOSES MILITARY SPENDING FREEZE TO NATO

Previous Proposals Recalled

LD100741 Moscow TASS in English 0711 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 10 TASS -- Follows the text of a proposal by members of the Warsaw Treaty organisation to NATO members on the question of a moratorium on increasing military spending:

1. The Warsaw Treaty member states firmly and consistently come out for resolute actions and concrete measures directed at stopping the arms race, starting real disarmament and averting the danger of war. They are for a comprehensive approach to the study of the problem of disarmament so that the elimination of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction would be accompanied by reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments with a corresponding reduction of military spending.

The rapid growth of military spending continues. These expenditures stimulate the arms race, this having extremely dangerous consequences for international peace and security, weighing down as a heavy burden on the peoples of all countries irrespective of the level of their economic development and slowing down economic and social progress. Being deeply concerned by this, the Warsaw Treaty member states believe that a reduction of military spending, first of all by states possessing nuclear arms and also a big military potential, would effectively help to curb the arms race and advance to disarmament. The funds thus released should be used for needs of social and economic development, including of developing countries.

2. Proceeding from these considerations the Warsaw Treaty member states proposed in the Political Declaration adopted on January 5, 1983 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Prague to start direct talks between Warsaw Treaty member states and the NATO member states with the aim of reaching a practical accord on the freezing of military spending and its subsequent reduction in terms of percentage or absolute figures. This initiative was confirmed and made more concrete on June 28, 1983 at the meeting in Moscow of the party leaders and statesmen of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia who again called on the NATO member states to enter negotiations to achieve an agreement on non-increasing military spending as of January 1, 1984 and on concrete measures concerning their mutual reduction in practice in the subsequent period.

On March 5, 1984 the Warsaw Treaty member states sent a proposal to NATO member states to start without delay direct talks on the question of non-increasing and reducing military spending. Possible steps leading to a solution of this question were also outlined.

In the statement adopted on October 24, 1985 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Sofia the Warsaw Treaty member states confirmed their proposal of direct talks with NATO member states on non-increasing and reducing military spending.

3. In an address to NATO member states, to all European countries with a programme of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, adopted at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Budapest on June 11, 1986, the Warsaw Treaty member states proposed that concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments be accompanied by a corresponding reduction of the military expenditures of states. The money saved as a result of these reductions should not be spent on the development of new types of armaments or on other military aims but should be used for needs of economic and social development.

4. Proceeding from their principled approach to the problem of disarmament the Warsaw Treaty member states call on the NATO member states to declare a mutual moratorium on the growth of military spending by the states of the two alliances for a period of one or two years.

This measure would be beneficial for the commencement of concrete talks on the question of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and create the necessary conditions for subsequent advance to an effective lowering of military spending by the member states of both military-political alliances. It would facilitate the strengthening of trust between states and an improvement of the political and economic situation in the world.

The Warsaw Treaty member states express hope that the NATO member states will give a prompt and positive response to this proposal.

Moscow Radio Commentary

LD112221 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0250 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Vladimir Pasko commentary]

[Text] As we have already reported, the member states of the Warsaw Pact have again proposed to the NATO countries a freeze on military expenditure, thus creating the necessary condition for a subsequent transition to effective reductions of military allocations. Here is commentator Vladimir Pasko:

[Pasko] This is not the first time that we have addressed the West with such an initiative. It was heard at the meeting of the leading party and state figures of the fraternal countries in 1983 and 1 year later, when it was proposed to the NATO countries to begin direct negotiations on this; we confirmed adherence to the idea of freezing military budgets in 1985; and last year too, when the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states met in Budapest again for its annual conference.

The idea of freezing military expenditure is not losing topicality; on the contrary, it is increasing. The cause of this is continuing militarization. Today, the world spends more than \$800,000 million already on military needs each year -- a sum so huge that it is unimaginable. It is claimed that just one-tenth of these resources would be enough to increase the basic capital of all developing countries by one third. It is perfectly obvious that if resources presently spent on armaments are channelled into construction for mankind, we will be rid of poverty and backwardness forever. However, it is not so much the extent of military spending that frightens one, as the rate at which it is growing. Today, 40 percent more resources in the world go to militaristic preparations than 10 years ago.

Supporters of militarism claim that the arms race is little short of a blessing. They have even reached the point of saying that it strengthens peace and are trying to convince people that it helps to increase employment and accelerate technical progress. But this is what the well-known observer Anthony Lewis writes in THE NEW YORK TIMES of 9 April: The huge sums our country spends on arms are one of the causes for our losing economic superiority over Japan and other countries. Indeed, even in the United States, which has almost one third of all spending on military needs in the world at present, they are now saying that the cause of the mess this country faces is, precisely, militarism. Such an admission allows one to say that the appeal of the socialist countries to freeze military spending is very timely. Evidence in favor of this is the broad discussion going on now in the West, prompted by the Soviet proposal to the United States to remove medium-range missiles from Europe. A new stimulus is given to it by Comrade Gorbachev's speech in Prague. People do not want to be in the position of being nuclear hostages of the United States. The broad masses of the West's populations are coming out for the elimination of nuclear arms and other mass-strike weapons and for the reduction of military confrontation. The proposal of the Socialist countries opens up a direct path to this.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

JAPAN'S NAKASONE DENIES SECRET NUCLEAR ACCORD WITH U.S.

OW060605 Tokyo KYODO In English 0555 GMT 6 Apr 87

[Text] Tokyo, April 6 KYODO -- Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone Monday flatly denied an opposition claim that Japan allowed the United States to bring in nuclear weapons under a secret bilateral accord signed in 1960.

Nakasone told reporters at his official residence: "As far as we know, no such accord exists. There is no secret agreement."

He said the current system for prior consultations with the U.S. on the introduction of nuclear arms in Japan under the Japan-U.S. security treaty is being kept "with sincerity."

But Nakasone said he has instructed the Foreign Ministry to look into the claim.

Mitsuhiro Kaneko, Secretariat chief of the Japan Communist Party, said Saturday his party mission found a declassified document at the U.S. National Archives, indicating the existence of a secret arrangement.

According to Kaneko, the document said former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk referred to the secrete accord in his instructions to then U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reishauer during February 1966 relating to the U.S.-drafted Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The paper said Reishauer should remind the Japanese Government of a 1960 secret accord concerning the U.S. introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

Successive Japanese Governments have maintained since there has been no prior consultations with the U.S., no U.S. nuclear arms have been introduced into Japan.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER ON NEED FOR DISARMAMENT, 'DEFENSE MIGHT'

PM031015 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 87 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Socialism and Peace Are Indivisible"]

[Text] The Great October Socialist Revolution was an unrivaled upsurge in the masses' historic creativity, the moment of truth for our country's people who had thrown off the yoke of capitalist and landowner exploitation. The forthcoming 70th anniversary of Great October is a great holiday for the Soviet people. But it is also a notable date in the history of the entire world. The Great October Socialist Revolution was the most outstanding event of the 20th century presaging the start of a new era in the life of mankind. Time has revealed in depth its abiding significance and shed light on the gigantic potential opened up by socialist social development.

The Decree on Peace was one of the first decrees of the victorious October. V.I. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, noted: "We now have power, the power of the Soviets. This power, promoted by the people themselves, places the great cause of peace for all the peoples on fertile soil." The Soviet state is steadily following Lenin's peace-loving course to this day. Loyalty to this course is of particularly great importance in our time when the development of military technology has made the world face a choice: surviving or perishing. This requires a courageous, profound reassessment of the prevailing situation and a new political thinking breaking with the ideas and views of the prenuclear era.

Loyal to the behests of Great October, Lenin's party of Soviet Communists has given a fitting response to the challenge of the times. The CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum laid the foundation to the formation of a new political thinking. It acquired its integral expression at the 27th party congress. The congress elaborated the CPSU's international strategy with regard to the realities of the present-day world. The new approach toward foreign policy problems is conditioned primarily by the fact that the safeguarding of security has now become primarily a political, not a military task: You cannot guarantee security for yourself if other states feel threatened. Reducing and eliminating this threat -- there is no more important task now.

The specific program put forward by the Soviet Union for eliminating weapons of mass annihilation on earth by the start of the next millenium and many other constructive initiatives of the motherland of October have met with the broadest response throughout the world. The Soviet Union's sincere desire for a world without nuclear and space weapons has found convincing confirmation in Reykjavik, which marked a qualitatively

new stage of the struggle for a nuclear-free world. The recent Soviet proposal on the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe offers good prospects for real headway on the path of consolidating the peoples' security.

The session of the Warsaw Pact states' Foreign Ministers' Committee held in Moscow in late March gave new impetus to the struggle to consolidate international security. The documents adopted at the session were pervaded with one concern -- strengthening and preserving peace, averting the threat of nuclear war looming over mankind, and developing and consolidating good-neighborly relations between states irrespective of their social system.

But the line toward the peoples' security actively pursued by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries is persistently and sometimes aggressively countered by a different line -- toward undermining military-strategic equilibrium and preparing for war. This is the line of imperialism and reaction. This is the line of those who do not want and who fear dialogue between states, of those who, for the sake of imposing their own mode of thinking and way of life on other peoples, are prepared to risk the fate of mankind. They are to blame for the fact that the arms race is continuing and the threat of nuclear war remains.

The world of our day is a world of struggle between reason and madness, morality and savagery, life and death. "We have defined our place in this struggle clearly and irrevocably," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central committee, said at the dinner in honor of British Prime Minister M. Thatcher. "We are on the side of reason, morality, and life. That is why we are in favor of disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, and the creation of a system of universal security."

Preparation for the 70th anniversary of October is taking place in a complex international situation. The future of the world -- a contradictory but single and interconnected world -- is being determined today. The plan can and must be rid of the threat of nuclear war. Life under conditions of security, independence, and progress can and must be ensured by the entire people. Not everything here depends on us -- on the USSR and on socialism -- notes the CPSU Central Committee address to the Soviet people in connection with the 70th anniversary of Great October, but what does depend on us we will do, and do in full.

The calculations of those who are hoping to achieve military superiority over socialism, who are trying to talk with us from a position of strength, are in vain. Historical experience shows that the USSR has always found an adequate response to any threat to its security. So it will be in the future. For this the Soviet Union possesses a sufficient intellectual scientific-technical, and industrial potential. Socialism's historic achievement has been its ability to maintain military-strategic parity.

The Soviet Army and Navy servicemen vigilantly stand guard over the gains of October. Defending socialism, Soviet servicemen are the same time safeguarding world peace and the peoples' security, because the socialist ideals of peace are the objective expression of the innermost needs of the overwhelming majority of mankind. The consistently peace-loving course of the CPSU and the Soviet state accords with the interests of all peoples of the world. The USSR approaches the solution of international problems realistically and flexibly, guided by the new political thinking.

The USSR will unswervingly lead matters to the point where on the threshold of the third millenium the states discard their nuclear armor to prevent weapons from being put into space and to reduce and ultimately destroy them on earth. But until the international reaction is lashing on the arms race, until it has abandoned its policy of social revenge and "crusades" against socialism, the CPSU and the Soviet state will do everything necessary to maintain the defense might of our country and the countries of the socialist community at the proper level. Soviet people, the CPSU Central Committee address stresses, can be confident that we will never allow imperialism's military superiority in any circumstances.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: THATCHER VISIT, INF, CW, NFZ'S

LD051834 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 5 Apr 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Rudolf Georgiyevich Kolchanov, editor-in-chief of TRUD; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Lebedev, member of NOVOYE VREMYA editorial board; and Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zholkver, political observer of Central Television and All-Union radio]

[Excerpt] [Zholkver] Hello, comrades. An important event in international life last week was the visit of the British prime minister to the Soviet Union. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo, having heard the reports on the results of the Soviet leaders' talks with Margaret Thatcher, noted their great importance both for bilateral relations and on the international level. The Politburo is convinced of the need to continue and deepen the political dialogue with Britain and with the other Western states in the spirit of the new thinking in order to overcome existing distrust and bring about a healthier international situation.

Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, I know you were in London on the eve of the visit. What was the mood there before the visit, and what is it now?

[Lebedev] You know, it's been very interesting to compare what we've been hearing from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, during her Moscow visit with what we heard in Britain -- from a great variety of British people, by the way. Let me explain that I was a member of a delegation of the Soviet Peace Committee, and that we were there at the invitation of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

[Zholkver] So there's a campaign for nuclear disarmament in Britain! The impression one has been getting is that everyone in Britain dreams of possessing nuclear weapons.

[Lebedev] That's what I had particularly in mind when I spoke of a certain bafflement that we couldn't help feeling when we heard Margaret Thatcher here, because indeed from what she said, our people could have received the impression that in Britain everyone lies in hopes of this famous nuclear means of intimidation -- the nuclear deterrent -- and that the British just cannot imagine how they could exist without the miracle-working qualities, so to speak, of nuclear weapons. It turns out that this is not so. This Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament that I spoke of is quite large. To begin with, its individual members number a quarter of a million. Then there have been a good few antinuclear meetings and demonstrations at which the Campaign has fielded at times up to 1 million people. Well, of course, what gives the Campaign strength as an organization is, without doubt, the Labor Party's program of renouncing nuclear weapons. We saw the movement and the Labor Party with our own eyes at our meetings in London, Cambridge and Bradford with various people representing various parties -- Labor,

Liberal, and Conservative MP's; incidentally, we met at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the London School of Economics. In other words, we are not judging by the opinion and arguments of some restricted circle of people, no. The Campaign and the Labor Party are by no means identical, but I'd say that they both do influence and support each other.

[Zholkver] Sorry to interrupt you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. You mentioned the Labor program, which you will of course have studied in detail, but I'd like to quote for the benefit of our listeners just one of its main points. By the way, the program is called "Europe — New Detente."

Well, here, literally, is what that document says: We live on a dangerous continent. There are 10,000 nuclear warheads deployed in Europe -- enough to wipe all cities from the face of the earth and turn this continent forever into a radioactive kingdom of nuclear winter. This threat of war in Europe, the Labor program goes on to say, creates an ever-present tension affecting all aspects of political and everyday life. It affects normal diplomatic relations, trade, culture, movement, scientific life, even the unity of the family -- practically the entire range of the activities both of governments and of individual citizens. The policy of the Labor Party, it says, is directed toward achieving a cessation of the buildup of the arsenals of nuclear weapons and a real reduction of the existing stockpiles.

[Lebedev] To make it a little clearer to our listeners what this actually means, and what the actual difference is between the position of the Britain that Margaret Thatcher represented here and that of the other Britain also existing and which, I stress, is by no means small in numbers according to public opinion poll results that have been quoted to us, about 40 percent of British people now support the renunciation of nuclear weapons.

[Zholkver] Well, does that mean that the other 60 percent are in favor of nuclear weapons?

[Lebedev] That's just the point, of course, that they're not so much in favor of nuclear weapons, but rather in favor of a certain myth, as it were, that's associated with nuclear weapons.

Well, in the first place, some of the British believe that to give up nuclear weapons would be to say goodbye, as it were, to their past as a great power, that they'd be shedding an attribute that a first-class power must have. This is a delusion.

The Labor Party and many people in other political parties say that the realization not, of course, of imperial ambitions but of the perfectly natural claim to an active role and prestige in international affairs must be sought in a quite different direction by other means. Well, there are also some people in Britain who do not support the intention of the Conservative government to acquire Trident-2's from the Americans and, in general, to increase Britain's nuclear weapons to something like eight times the present level. Labor Party leader Kinnock has even mentioned a figure of 16 times.

[Zholkver] Trident is a missile for submarines?

[Lebedev] For nuclear submarines. These missile systems are so designed that they can carry a very large quantity of nuclear warheads. A proportion of British people advocates a freeze on nuclear weapons at this level. A great many Britons -- certainly more than half now -- are in favor of removing the U.S. cruise missiles as well as other U.S. nuclear weapons from their country's territory. There is now almost half, you can say, opposed in one form or another to nuclear weapons and in favor of renouncing the concept of the nuclear deterrent. This theme of the need for a new kind of political thinking was present everywhere in our conversations there.

[Zholkver] Yes, I saw a report that after Margaret Thatcher returned to London, when she was speaking in Parliament about the results of her visit, the British MP's taking part in the debate on the one hand made a positive assessment of the result of the visit, but noted that on a number of topical questions, primarily on the problems of arms control, the British prime minister adopted an unconstructive stance at the talks in Moscow. For example, prominent Labor Party figure Michael Foot appraised her statement in favor of nuclear weapons as a dangerous course.

Such a course, he said, only promotes the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which may ultimately lead to disaster.

[Kolchanov] I believe our position, the position of those conducting today's roundtable discussion, and that of various political circles in Britain coincide in that we single out among the questions that were examined during Margaret Thatcher's visit to the Soviet Union the question of nuclear disarmament. That is generally the top priority topic in international affairs.

In the first place, the more nuclear weapons there are in the wide world, the greater is the possibility and the danger that they will be used by some maniac, or madman, or adventurer, or whoever. You know that making a nuclear bomb is now a fairly simple matter, and small-size nuclear weapons do exist. The U.S. forces stationed in West Europe, for instance, have the Echo or Delta-type nuclear backpack mines. A shell or mine of this type almost can be carried about in your handbag. The existence of nuclear weapons is, in itself, already an enormous threat. Even their accidental use is a source of great alarm to the people.

Second, the very fact of nuclear weapons being used as a means of maintaining the balance of terror, as a deterrent, and so forth presupposes a policy of blackmail and threat.

This very fact already implies the desire to exploit in one way or another the existing state of affairs: to make use of some slight advantage or some bad situation in order to pursue the highly dangerous policy of blackmail and threat. Third and finally, the longer we go on producing nuclear weapons, the greater, undoubtedly, will be the role played by militarist circles in the life of society -- in domestic politics, and in foreign policy also. What this phenomenon is fraught with is not, I think, something that we need to say much about.

[Lebedev] Yes, and incidentally, Margaret Thatcher, too, very often has used in defense, as it were, of her adherence to nuclear weapons this supposed fact that there is an advantage in conventional and chemical weapons in favor of the East, on the side of the Soviet Union. We made a special point of raising this question in Britain

itself. At the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Institute's director, Admiral Flerle, and a group of highly qualified scientific experts at Bradford University specializing in military affairs both have given the unequivocal answer that parity also exists in conventional weapons in Europe, and that if there is any asymmetry, any difference, then it poses no threat at all to the West. In general, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, I think we need to try to look at this problem a bit more in both its global and its general European aspect.

[Zholkver] At present this question of a nuclear-free world, a nuclear-free Europe, is being discussed not only in Britain or France: discussion actually is going on throughout Europe, both East and West, and a number of forums exist for it. In Geneva, the disarmament conference is in progress. The materials of the recent Moscow session of the Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states have been circulated there as official documents. You know that the matters discussed there have included both nuclear disarmament and the abolition of chemical weapons, on which a special statement has been issued, and -- what is no less important -- the questions concerning a substantial reduction of conventional armaments. After all, what we have in mind is not to abolish nuclear weapons while leaving intact conventional armaments, which -- here Margaret Thatcher is right -- indeed have caused two world wars without nuclear weapons, both of them very destructive.

[Kolchanov] This notion that we want to abolish nuclear weapons while retaining conventional arms is one that they actually are trying to put over to the man in the street in the West; but you are quite right to stress that this actually is not the case. One stage of disarmament, one Soviet proposal, is accompanied by a series of other proposals which, as a whole, represent a systemic picture of disarmament. We talk about medium missiles [as heard], and immediately declare that as soon as agreement is reached on medium missiles [as heard], we will remove our operational and tactical weapons from Czechoslovakia and the GDR -- increased-range weapons -- which were introduced in reply to NATO's upgrading.

[Zholkver] In reply to the Pershings.

[Kolchanov] Yes, to the Pershings. Then we say that we are willing to begin talks immediately on the other operational and tactical weapons that exist in Europe. We further say that you have on the table our proposals on conventional armaments. Here I must mention that the 23 states have now begun consultations in Vienna precisely for the purpose of drawing up a mandate for the next conference, which solely will discuss this question. Here there's no denying that priority belongs to the Soviet Union. All this is being done on our initiative and at our insistence.

[Lebedev] Rudolf Georgiyevich, what about chemical weapons? At the Geneva disarmament conference, discussion of these problems has not been going on for a very long time. In general there is a considerable willingness to sign an international convention banning chemical weapons and providing for their total abolition. Incidentally, Britain, a little while ago, did seem to be adopting a fairly constructive position, and one that in many of its aspects coincided, or at least met with understanding in our country and many others. Who is holding things up? They tell us it's the Americans -- that is what they've been telling us in Britain. But who, one may ask, has more influence on the United States -- in the framework of the famous Anglo-American special relationship -- than Margaret Thatcher herself, on President

Reagan? That's where Britain could play its own considerable independent and positive role, just as, incidentally, with the concluding of a treaty banning all nuclear tests. In his time, Margaret Thatcher's predecessor, Harold Macmillan, also leader of the Conservative Party and prime minister, played, as we remember, as we know, quite a constructive part in the concluding of the agreement to ban nuclear tests in the three environments signed in Moscow by the USSR, United States and Britain.

[Kolchanov] I think that in general Europe now stands before a qualitatively new stage of detente. Europe's fortunes since the war have been complicated; there have been steps up and down, both in detente and in cooperation; but if we look at the central problem, as it were, from 1945 to 1946 up to the present, one thing that can be noted is that during all those years, the nuclear presence on the continent of Europe steadily has been increasing to one degree or another.

For the first time we are now on the threshold of the possibility of the nuclear presence not being increased but, just the reverse, being lessened. This is to my mind a qualitatively new stage in European detente, although many other very important initiatives regarding all-European cooperation could be added to this.

[Zholkver] Among these initiatives I should like to note a whole number of important ones belonging to the European socialist countries — The GDR and Czechoslovakia. For instance, there has been the idea of the formation of what is called a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe. This idea was put forward by both the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Contacts were established, for example, between the SED Party and the FRG's Social Democratic Party.

It is now already a joint project. What is more, a speech by Comrade Honecker, for instance, proposed that representatives of the governments of both the German states hold talks on the question of their possible contribution to the creation of this nuclear-free Central Europe, where they occupy such important positions on the line of contact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact states. During the past week there have been quite a few contacts on this matter. Comrade Guenter Mittag, secretary of the Central Committee and member of the SED Central Committee Politburo, was in Bonn and had a meeting with Chancellor Kohl. I would, in general, note the fact that of late Bonn has been a capital where extensive discussions are being held on the issues of strengthening peace in Central Europe and nuclear disarmament. Of course these discussions are not all of a uniform character.

[Lebedev] Nevertheless what is the position now being adopted by the Bonn government?

[Zholkver] You know, it is not of course a uniform position. Indeed during the past week there was a discussion in Moscow — which I followed very attentively — a discussion within the framework of what is called the Bergedorf discussion group. Attending were representatives of both the ruling parties in the Bonn coalition as well as the opposition parties. It is interesting that after returning to Bonn a figure, for instance, such as Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU parliamentary group — a person who does not have a particular sympathy for us, like the whole of that group — nevertheless spoke in favor of the elimination of all medium-range missiles in Europe, considering that this also would serve as an impetus for achieving agreement on other aspects of disarmament, in particular on eliminating chemical weapons. Of course, the so-called steel helmet group also exists within the framework of the same CDU group.

[Kolchanov] With Dregger at its head.

[Zholkver] Yes, with the chairman of this parliamentary group at its head. The steel helmet group, which also is known as Yesterday's Men, counts on strength, including nuclear weapons. But, after all, one must say that this is doubly dangerous for the FRG, inasmuch as it is precisely on FRG soil that all the 108 Pershings, which you, Rudolf Georgiyevich, mentioned are located. Living alongside them is, of course, very dangerous. I have seen interesting statements by the burgomeisters of two West German towns, Mutlangen and Heilbronn. They have alongside their towns indeed the Pershing missile sitings. Cruise missiles are now being added to these. The burgomeisters of the two towns belong to the CDU and both of them are in favor of removing as speedily as possible these monsters, as they call them. This does not reek of sympathy for nuclear deterrence.

[Lebedev] That is right, but of course the stereotypes are to my mind even more pronounced, Aleksandr Vladimirovich. I am deeply convinced that West Europe -- each country separately and West Europe as a whole, since they continuously are talking about their unity within the framework of the European Economic Community -- can, and even in my view, are bound to play a more active and positive role in achieving agreements on key issues. Indeed I do not want the information media -- as is often the case in the West -- to once again immediately take us by the hand and begin to clamor that we allegedly are attempting to drive wedges between the two shores of the Atlantic. It is not a matter of wedges, but common sense that must prompt the conclusion that it is absolutely no betrayal of even NATO solidarity if they explain to the U.S. Administration that SDI, for example, is plainly not in the interests of international security, that it is a threat, and, in particular, that it provides nothing toward the safeguarding of West Europe's security.

Unfortunately, we see that attempts now are being made to complicate the achievement of an agreement on medium-range missiles, which is now close, thanks to our action of 28 February. Attempts now are being made to create in place of one package of a new one and to add on to medium-range missiles shorter-range missiles, conventional weapons, and even human rights, which they are dragging in literally by the ears. This is of course an unseemly game.

[Zholkver] I am aware, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, that you are, so to speak, a European specialist. Before being in London you were recently in Spain, and you spoke about that in our last discussion. But, after all, this discussion goes beyond the framework of Europe alone. There is at the present time an interesting visit to Europe -- presently to East Europe -- by Narayan Dutt Tiwari, India's minister of external affairs. He has visited Czechoslovakia and Poland. Discussions were held, and it has been stressed by all sides -- the Indian, Czechoslovak and Polish sides -- that only a political dialogue and constructive cooperation between countries with different social systems can improve the international climate, the entire international climate, and not just the climate in Europe. I must say that the voice, of course, of India, which is a leading world and nonaligned power, is heeded everywhere and not just in Asia. Indeed, it is highly symptomatic that these statements in favor of a nuclear-free world and a non-violent world are to be heard at precisely this time when such a discussion also is taking place on the European continent.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY 8 APRIL PRESS BRIEFING

Reagan's Remarks 'Hostile'

LD080901 Moscow TASS in English 0848 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- Hostile remarks made by President Reagan concerning the Soviet Union Tuesday cannot but cause indignation and regret among us, said Vladimir Petrovskiy, a deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R. He spoke at a news conference in Moscow today.

It can hardly be considered an accident that such a crucial moment, when preparations are nearing completion for the visit of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to Moscow, was chosen for yesterday's series of anti-Soviet pronouncements. It is an open secret that objective prerequisites are taking shape for headway in resolving the issues which determine Soviet-American relations and for reaching accords in the key area of security, accords which all nations are awaiting from us.

It appears that some people in Washington are displeased with such a prospect, Vladimir Petrovskiy went on to say. So, they are working up psychosis in a bid to poison the atmosphere in which Soviet-American talks are to be held.

Such actions have already become a characteristic feature of Washington's behavior. Such unworthy tricks are used each time when some serious business is to be done. However, I would like to express the hope that the American side will have enough dignity and responsibility to deal with security issues at long last, and to do so in real earnest, so as to find a mutually acceptable solution to them, said the deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R.

Significance of Shultz Visit

LD081033 Moscow TASS in English 1020 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- We are getting ready for the visit of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to the Soviet Union with entire responsibility and attach great importance to it, said Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R. He spoke at a news conference for Soviet and foreign media people in Moscow today.

Our proposals for arms limitation and disarmament, primarily as regards its main, nuclear and space, direction are well-known to the American side. We hope that this time the U.S. representative will not be empty-handed when he comes to Moscow. It is

important that the visit proceed in an adequate situation and that all kinds of propaganda campaigns not poison the atmosphere in the run-up to the visit. The visit is of major significance and a corresponding attitude to it is required on the part of all those who are related to it, the deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R. emphasized.

Moscow TV Broadcast

LD090553 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1910 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Report on 8 April USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry Press Center news conference entitled: "On Dialogue Regarding the Creation of a Universal System of International Security," with B. P. Pyadyshev, deputy head of the information directorate of the Foreign Ministry, presiding, and V. F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, V. I. Goldanskiy, and Ch. T. Aytmatov; replacing "World Today" program--recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified reporter, over video of interior of Press Center] In Moscow a news conference on the theme of dialogue regarding the creation of a universal system of international security has taken place. It was opened by Comrade Pyadyshev, deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry. Comrade Petrovskiy, deputy USSR foreign minister, addressed the journalists. [video shows four officials on platform, identified by nameplates, are, from left: V.I. Goldanskiy, V.F. Petrovskiy, B.P. Pyadyshev, and Ch.To. Aytmatov].

[Petrovskiy] The first months of 1987 have been crammed with major international meetings, forums, and talks. Of course, each meeting is important and specific in itself, in the overall political sense: A multi-level dialogue on questions of ensuring security that is equal to all, and, first and foremost, away from the central military-political trend, is being developed and is gaining strength.

Generally speaking, this is not surprising, insofar as a solution to the most important task of our times -- the survival of mankind -- depends on the state of affairs in the area of disarmament.

Dialogue on security issues has assumed a systematic nature. It is now taking place, in essence, on various levels, and it encompasses various areas. All the bilateral and multilateral talks in progress on limiting armaments and disarmaments, all efforts to improve and develop political, economic, and humanitarian relations between states, and all actions aimed at settling regional conflicts, the development of the European process, and the appearance of the first elements of a similar process in the Asian and Pacific region, in the Mediterranean region, and elsewhere -- all these, in the final analysis, go to make up general dialogue among states about the building of a world in which all will be secure.

A new political thinking is being shaped in the process of such dialogue. Practical ways of conducting international relations in accordance with the realities of the nuclear-space age are being determined.

It is well known that the 27th CPSU Congress gave a powerful impetus to broad discussion in the world arena on the problem of comprehensive, universal security.

The Soviet Union proposed a fundamental basis for a future system of such security, the general guidelines for a nuclear-free world, as well as a unique methodological approach: the renunciation of military-technical resolutions, in favor of political solutions, and a quest for such solutions by joint efforts. The establishment of a system of a nuclear-free and coercion-free world, and the development and deepening of constructive dialogue to this end is the principled course of the Soviet state, the origins of which go back to 1917.

At that time, 70 years ago, in its first legislative act, the Decree on Peace, the Soviet state, which had only just come into being, set forth the concept of a just and democratic peace that was radical for its time. Today, too, our country is setting forth a philosophy of security which is revolutionary in its nature. It is proposing to make peaceful coexistence the supreme, universal principle of international relations.

Then, in October 1917, Soviet Russia pointed to a way out of the world war unleashed by the imperialists. Today the Soviet Union, demonstrating its new thinking, is setting forth a program to rid mankind of nuclear, chemical, and any other threat of destruction. Like the Decree on Peace, our program of security for all is addressed not only to governments, but also to peoples. Our participation in the dialogue on all-round, universal security is backed up by specific deeds and practical measures. This is once again illustrated by the Soviet Union's proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe, which makes possible a move toward nuclear disarmament.

At the same time, it is necessary, of course, to take account of the fact that productive dialogue on security issues has its own inner logic. It presupposes movement of the partners closer together. As for the Soviet Union, it is ready, and, as you see, is proceeding along its part of that road.

By putting forward the goal of developing wide-scale dialogue on problems of security, the Soviet Union notes with satisfaction that ideas of security are beginning to enter the practice of world politics. Reykjavik outlined the contours of a world free from the fear of nuclear annihilation. The Stockholm accords on confidence-building measures in Europe, the Vienna conventions on the safety of peaceful development of nuclear-power engineering, and the Delhi declaration signed at the end of last year by the Soviet and Indian leaders, bear the stamp of the new thinking. The Soviet Union starts with the premise that dialogue should develop in breadth and depth.

[Pyadyzhev] The NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY correspondent has a question for Comrade Aytmatov: The Issyk-kul forum made a major contribution to uniting cultural figures for peace and against the nuclear threat. What are Soviet writers and cultural figures planning to do to continue these efforts? Over to you, Chingiz Tarikovich.

[Aytmatov] I believe that our Issyk-kul forum also had a part, to a degree, in the establishment of this system of thinking, and fostering dialogue and exchanges of views on the most topical and burning issues affecting various societies' and various social systems, and our shared human culture, our spiritual potential. Our motto, "Survival Through Creativity," includes much. It includes everything that might assist people make sense of and become aware of themselves, both as individuals of the 20th century and as people responsible for the general state of the world.

I would like to say that all our reflections and discussions had a definite historic target, against which we measured, as it were, all our dreams and our resolve: the portals of a new century, the 21st century, and a new millenium, the 3d millenium.

We intend to continue our meetings in the future, to give them a more or less regular nature, so to speak, and to discuss each time at our meetings all the things that worry us at that moment; all that we deem it vital and necessary to discuss in the interests of the development of the culture of all mankind, and of the humanitarian spirit of all mankind.

[Pyadyshev] A question from the correspondent of the Japanese paper ASAHI for Academician Goldanskiy: Isn't the idea of a nuclear-free world utopian?

[Goldanskiy] I should like to stress that we understand nuclear-free world to mean a world free of nuclear weapons, but in no sense a world free of nuclear power. Of course, the building of a nuclear-free world is an extremely complex task. Here we do not make light of the difficulties, but we think that mankind has no alternative path to take. The conditions for the establishment of a nuclear-free world will be forged during the process of their constuction. [sentence as heard] Here one has to consider a ban on nuclear weapons. The very process of nuclear disarmament, and knowledge of nuclear weapons and nuclear power-engineering will be required, if only to use the 50,000 or 60,000 warheads already stockpiled for power-engineering purposes, to convert nuclear explosives into nuclear fuel, i.e. to beat swords into plowshares, in the most literal sense. In principle, that amount is enough for 200 power sets with a capacity of 20 million kw.

Here it seems to me there is very great scope for international scientific cooperation.

[Pyadyshev] Yes please, your question.

[Trofimova] Olga Trofimova, APN observer. Vladimir Fedorovich, you spoke of international dialogue as a school of cooperation and joint creativity. In that light, could you say a few words about the reaction of the West to the proposal by Czechoslovakia and the GDR to establish a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe? Thank you.

[Petrovskiy] I believe you have asked a very important and truly interesting question. In the process of fruitful dialogue, talks about the proposal by the GDR and Czechoslovakia to establish a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe would be of great significance. This would be of great importance from the standpoint of reducing military confrontation and improving the general situation on the European Continent. But alas, thus far this proposal has not met with any response from those to whom it was addressed.

Generally speaking, I have to say that in international relations a rather strange situation has been developing recently. Sometimes a certain proposal is set forth, nurtured by various people, including sober-minded representatives of the West.

This happened with the idea of this corridor, an idea which in its original form was put forward by Sweden. When this proposal became an official proposal by the socialist states, however, for some reason a blind eye was turned to it.

Incidentally, the same thing happened with the theme we are discussing today. After all, the idea of international dialogue on world security, equal security for all, was first formulated by the Palme commission, which included, you will recall, prominent figures of state from the United States, Sweden, Norway, and many other countries.

As soon as we proposed dialogue, an exchange of views on this issue, some of those who were present at the conception of this proposal, have now begun to renounce it. In this I see a sort of relapse of the logic of the days of confrontation, when some people do not even bother to look and see what a given proposal contains, and what the idea in it is.

[Pyadyshev] A question for Comrade Petrovskiy from the correspondent for the West German paper DIE WAHRHEIT: What is the news from Chernobyl? Are journalists able to visit it? What can you tell us about the coming visit to Moscow by George Shultz, the U.S. secretary of state? Over to you, Vladimir Fedorovich.

[Petrovskiy] I must assure all journalists, and I have spoken to the competent organizations, that there are no grounds for anxiety or worry. I have been told that the water is in an absolutely normal state. There are no grounds for concern. I must also report that admission of visitors to Chernobyl AES has not been stopped, but merely restricted.

As to your second question, the question regarding the coming arrival in Moscow of Shultz, the U.S. secretary of state, we are getting ready for the forthcoming visit of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to the Soviet Union with all responsibility and attach great importance to it.

Our proposals for arms limitation and disarmament, primarily as regards its main, nuclear and space, direction are well-known to the U.S. side. We hope that this time the U.S. representative will not be empty-handed when he comes to Moscow. It is important that the visit proceed in an appropriate atmosphere and that all kinds of propaganda campaigns not poison the atmosphere in the run-up to the visit. The visit is of major significance and a corresponding attitude to it is required on the part of all those who are related to it.

[Reporter] Replies to other questions from correspondents were also given.

Need for International Dialogue

LD080915 Moscow TASS in English 0900 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- A new mode of political thinking is being shaped and practical ways are being defined to make international relations match the realities of the nuclear-space age at the current dialogue on security issues, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy told a press conference here today.

The USSR's course towards transforming international relations on a new democratic, humanistic basis to ensure genuine security for all stemmed from the policy of restructuring and more democracy that was being pursued inside the country, the Soviet spokesman said.

Responsibility to peoples demanded that governments realize organic unity between internal and foreign policy and growing interrelationship between states and peoples.

"In our approach to the dialogue on comprehensive, universal security, we do not claim a monopoly on truth," Petrovskiy said. "It demands a search, honest efforts by each and every one. That is precisely why the Soviet Union regards international dialogue as a school of cooperation and joint construction, including for ourselves, as a school of political interaction the lack of which has been making itself felt."

"The USSR will consistently follow a line towards achieving practical results. Our participation in the dialogue on comprehensive, universal security is corroborated by specific deeds, by practical measures," said the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman.

"This is also evidenced by the Soviet Union's proposal for eliminating medium-range missiles from Europe, a proposal that helps to embark on the path of nuclear disarmament."

A resultative dialogue on security issues provided for partners' movement towards one another, Petrovskiy said. As to the Soviet Union, it was ready to, and was marching along its part of the way.

By putting forward the goal of developing a broad-scale dialogue on security problems, the Soviet Union noted with satisfaction that the ideas of security were beginning to enter the practice of world politics.

Reykjavik outlined a world free from the fear of nuclear annihilation, he observed. The Stockholm accords on confidence-building measures in Europe, the Vienna conventions on safety of nuclear engineering and the Delhi declaration signed by the Indian and Soviet leaders last year were marked by the new mentality.

The Soviet Union believed that the dialogue should be made broader and deeper.

"We reckon that not only governments, but also the general public and mass media will contribute to developing the dialogue and ultimately shaping such a comprehensive security system that would match the present-day realities and meet the interests of the whole of mankind," Petrovskiy said.

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RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA CARRIES GROMYKO, MATLOCK MEETING

PM081503 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS report: "U.S. Ambassador Presents Credentials"]

[Text] On 6 April, A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, received Jack F. Matlock, U.S. ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, who presented his credentials.

Speaking during the ceremony, J. Matlock said in particular:

I have the honor to present to Your Excellency the credentials by which the U.S. President accredits me as an ambassador.

It is a personal and professional honor for me to present my credentials as ambassador of the United States to the Soviet Union. For the greater part of my diplomatic career I have been engaged on problems directly connected with relations between our two countries. This is the fourth time the U.S. Government has appointed me to serve in our embassy in Moscow.

My study of your country and my previous periods of residence here have given me a knowledge of the deep-seated values of Russian culture as well as of the culture of the other peoples living in the Soviet Union.

Although our two countries adhere to completely different values, we have many common interests. Furthermore, we share a common responsibility which goes far beyond the specific content of bilateral mutual relations.

It seems to me that the deepening of mutual relations between our countries is an extremely important matter and we must create a foundation of trust without which it will be very difficult to achieve mutually beneficial goals.

I shall personally make every effort to attain that goal and shall always be at your disposal and the disposal of the Soviet government.

I am hoping to renew and deepen my acquaintance with your great land and its talented peoples.

Receiving the ambassador's credentials, A.A. Gromyko stated:

First I should like to welcome you as an ambassador who has presented his credentials to us.

This fact in itself would seem to be a purely formal manifestation of tradition. It is through the exchange of ambassadors that countries speak to each other.

In our country you will be representing a major world power -- the United States. You will have dealings with the representatives of another major world power -- the Soviet Union.

The whole world has long listened to what these powers say to one another, even if they speak in a whisper. It is quite clear why.

History has developed in such a way that those powers have in their hands the most awesome weapons that man has ever invented. Hardly anyone today will deny that if those weapons are put to use through the dictate of someone's recklessness, not even the sound of human speech will be left on earth.

This gives rise to the simple conclusion: Both powers must protect themselves and the whole world from catastrophe. Not only their supreme leadership but also their diplomatic services can and must contribute to the great cause of preserving peace on earth.

Geneva and Reykjavik are important milestones on the difficult path of talks which the two powers are taking. The main aim of the talks -- the removal of the threat of nuclear war -- has still not been achieved.

Thus, there is still much work to be done, including by diplomats, if the edifice of lasting peace is to be built when all the peoples can breathe freely without fear for tomorrow.

Our ideas and our concrete proposals are well known to the U.S. Government and, indeed, to the whole world. They were expounded by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the relevant statements.

We should like to express the hope that unlike now there will be an objective approach shown toward them, an approach which corresponds to the enormous scale of the tasks facing our countries in ensuring lasting peace on earth.

In your work, which is designed to improve relations between our countries, you will always find our cooperation, Mr Ambassador.

Then A.A. Gromyko and J. Matlock had a conversation.

The chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium set out the Soviet Union's principled approach to the search for ways to resolve the crucial problems of ensuring international security, eliminating the threat of war, and ending the arms race.

"The Soviet Union's proposals in this sphere are aimed," he noted, "at ensuring that nuclear weapons are never used. To that end they must be destroyed."

"We have done everything possible to ensure normal relations between the Soviet Union and the United States," A.A. Gromyko stressed. "We have submitted our concrete proposals on this score but in reply various maneuvers have been used to avoid resolving the burning problems. All this is evidence the U.S. Administration at present clearly has no serious intentions of seeking agreements."

J. Matlock expressed a certain optimism regarding the possibility of reaching accords between the USSR and the United States.

Also present during the conversation were T.N. Menteshashvili, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy foreign minister; and Richard Coombes, minister counsellor at the U.S. Embassy in the USSR.

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RELATED ISSUES

FRG'S SCHMIDT IN MOSCOW FOR PEACE COMMITTEE

Talks With Gromyko

PM310957 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 87 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "A. A. Gromyko Meets With Helmut Schmidt"]

[Text] In the Kremlin on 27 March, A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, received Helmut Schmidt, the eminent West German public figure and former FRG federal chancellor, and had a talk with him held in a frank and friendly atmosphere. H. Schmidt is in Moscow to participate in a Soviet-West German public meeting organized by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and the Bergedorf discussion club in the FRG.

During the talk certain questions of bilateral relations between the USSR and the FRG were discussed, as were a number of problems of the current international situation.

A.A. Gromyko stressed that we will not resolve the question of lasting peace until we find a way to eliminate nuclear weapons and as long as mankind, figuratively speaking, is sitting on a nuclear powder keg.

"We know," he noted, "that science has helped us to recognize what the nuclear monster is. If it exploded on our planet it could engulf it. So why does a country like the FRG continue to underestimate the terrible danger for Europe, over which a nuclear sword hangs? The Soviet Union is convinced that everything possible must be done to ensure that this sword does not fall on mankind."

H. Schmidt noted that FRG citizens agree with these words and added that if the United States had adopted the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on nuclear tests, the world would now look considerably different. A.A. Gromyko talked about the changes taking place in the USSR's domestic life, which reflect the desire of the Communist Party and the Soviet people to fully use socialism's potential. Fundamental restructuring is necessary to improve leadership of all aspects of our life. Soviet domestic policy also accords with foreign policy tasks, and, on the whole, as M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has stressed repeatedly, our domestic and foreign policy are solidly and inextricably bound together.

Kohl Advisor: Ties Will Develop

LD272325 Hamburg DPA in German 2246 GMT 27 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow (DPA) — Today A.A. Gromyko received former Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in the Kremlin. The Soviet news agency TASS reported that the talk took place in an open and friendly atmosphere. Schmidt is in Moscow to attend the 10th German-Soviet round of discussions as part of the so-called Bergedorfer discussion club. According to TASS, Gromyko said during his talk with Schmidt that the question of a lasting peace could not be solved until a way for eliminating nuclear weapons was found.

Horst Teltschik, foreign affairs adviser to Chancellor Kohl, who is also attending the round of discussions, said that the most important result of this German-Soviet discussion by politicians is "that the traffic light is again showing green, which means that relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union will be developing." This was stated by Teltschik in an interview with the ZDF program HEUTE JOURNAL.

One important interlocutor told him that 1987 would be the year for intensifying German-Soviet relations. "That is a very good signal," Chancellor Helmut Kohl's advisor said. Initial arrangements have been made between the Federal Government and the Soviet leadership which now have to be implemented so that relations would be on a solid base.

Valentin Falin, head of the Soviet press agency NOVOSTI, underlined in the interview with HEUTE JOURNAL: "We really do want peace for our people, for our country, for our friends. And we want nothing else for you, the Federal Republic, and its friends." Not only have weapons become superfluous, but they entail damage, and not merely damage of a physical kind, but a very great political damage. "Therefore, we do not need them and we wish to get rid of them," Falin said.

Dialogue on Peace, Ties Ends

LD281708 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1235 GMT 28 Mar 87

[Excerpt] Moscow, 28 March (TASS) — A Soviet-West German meeting of political and social figures and representatives of science and business circles organized by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (SCDP) and the Bergedorf discussion club (FRG) ended here today. For 2 days there has been a frank [otkrovennyy] and businesslike conversation on the outlook for the development of the international situation, on what needs to be done to make the world peaceful and to successfully develop economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation between the countries.

In our very dangerous and very complex world, any dialogue is useful, said the writer Genrikh Borovik, chairman of the SCDP. After all, silence and absence of dialogue always leads to breakdown in communication and to greater danger.

As we see it, the present meeting is filled with special meaning inasmuch as it is taking place not only at a critically dangerous time, but at one which also gives grounds for hope. It would be said if a meeting of this type where people exchange

arguments resembled a tennis match at which the opponents respectfully exchange strikes with one another and then separate each with his own opinion and his own skill. There is only one conclusion after such a meeting: If my partner hits it firmly from the right, I must hit it firmly from the left, or vice versa.

This is not the point of this meeting; it is not to sharpen arguments. Its aim is to understand one another's positions and to find the means for rapprochement. It is necessary to think in a new way; and for this, one must be able to understand and to listen to each other. I hope that the Moscow meeting is one of the stages on the way to this, said Genrikh Borovik. [passage omitted]

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA CITES SWEDISH MINISTER ON DISARMAMENT POLICY

PM201911 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "A Significant Step in the Matter of Disarmament"]

[Text] Stockholm, 18 Mar--Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson has expressed the hope that the proposal on eliminating medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe will contribute to significant progress at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. He was delivering a government statement today in the Riksdag (parliament) in which he devoted a great deal of attention to problems of disarmament and the elimination of the nuclear threat.

At the United Nations, at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and within the framework of the "Delhi six" Sweden will continue to contribute to the elaboration of measures in the sphere of arms reduction which could be implemented in the very near future, the minister noted. These measures will at the same time mark a significant step in the achievement of wider disarmament. They include, in particular, demands for an immediate halt to nuclear explosions, the holding of talks aimed at concluding a multilateral treaty on halting such tests, and also the elaboration of agreements blocking the spread of the arms race to space.

S. Andersson confirmed the Swedish Government's desire to continue steps to create a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. Sweden intends to continue conducting a firm and consistent policy of neutrality.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

PM031014 Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Apr 87 p 3

[Interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev by Alain Jacob in Paris--date not given]

[Excerpt] Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev has special responsibility for the Asia and Pacific region. He ended a visit to Paris on 31 March in which he had consultations at the Quai d'Orsay which were devoted mainly to the prospects opened up by the speech delivered by CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev in Vladivostok on 28 July. He also informed his hosts about the impressions he received during his recent tour of six South Pacific and Southeast Asian countries with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. He granted us an interview before he returned to Moscow.

At the bilateral level, Mr Rogachev noted that there are naturally "disagreements" between the French and Soviets if only on the treaty relating to a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific (which the USSR and China support, but not France) or on New Caledonia, on which Moscow abides by the UN General Assembly resolutions. However, the Soviet deputy foreign minister does not seem to regard these "disagreements" as very worrying. "I said," he stressed, "that the USSR's policy for developing its relations with the small South Pacific countries was not intended to harm third countries.... It was explained to me that France has had a presence in the Pacific for 200 years and that it has interests there. We hope it will have a presence there for another 200 years and we respect its interests. But we are also asking France to respect the principles on which our policy is based." The USSR now clearly wants to have a much more active role in this part of the world.

Since the Vladivostok speech, Mr Rogachev explained, this policy is intended to be developed "in three directions."

-- "Not increasing and not allowing the proliferation of nuclear arms" in the region, the U.S., Soviet, and Chinese nuclear arms being taken into account as "currently operational," which would not be the case with the Indian bomb;

-- "Reducing the activities of the fleets," both American and Soviet, in the Pacific and Indian Ocean;

-- "Finally, the reduction of conventional forces" in the region in which the Soviet deputy minister thinks there are now 17 million men in the armed forces of various countries.

It goes without saying that nothing can be done in these areas without the United States, which at present not only at sea but in Japan and South Korea.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET JOURNALISTS, SCHOLAR DISCUSS ASIA, PACIFIC

PM201310 [Editorial Report] Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 March 1987 carries on pages 9 and 14 a 4,000-word "Dialogue" between Georgiy Kim, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Igor Belyayev, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political observer, under the heading "Do Not Open a 'Second Front' of World Catastrophe," concerning the situation in Asia and the Pacific.

The participants begin by discussing Asia and the Pacific region in the context of the "system of comprehensive international security," as defined by M.S. Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech. Kim points to negative phenomena such as the involvement of certain Asian countries in a military-strategic alliance with the United States," referring to the presence of "more than 1,000 units of American nuclear ammunition in South Korea" and the "militarization of Japan," and this leads into a discussion of the American military presence in Asia, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean.

Kim expresses the view that "Soviet-Japanese problems could best be discussed and resolved within the framework of an unhindered Moscow-Tokyo dialogue," while Belyayev observes that "Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, in preparing for the meeting with the Soviet leader, is hurrying to consolidate relations with the United States, China, and South Korea." Kim goes on to note the U.S. opposition to the Soviet proposal on "substantially lowering the level of naval activity in all the world's oceans," and Belyayev points out that "the ASEAN countries' interest in the idea of a nuclear-free zone" in the Pacific worries the United States. They note with approval the growing awareness of the "real danger of nuclear catastrophe" among Asian countries, and mention that Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, and Israel are among the countries close to creating their own nuclear weapons.

"[Kim] On a number of key issues of international relations, the PRC's and the Soviet Union's positions virtually coincide. We and China have expressed an interest in the further relaxation of the international situation and the lowering of the level of confrontation. Our views on the reduction of nuclear strategic forces coincide with those of the PRC. China and the Soviet Union have pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and come out in favor of ending the arms race and against the militarization of space.

"[Belyayev] Secretary of State G. Shultz has just been to the PRC. It takes no lengthy commentary to demonstrate the nature of the tasks he was tackling in Beijing, where the guest met with the Chinese leadership. It is far more interesting and significant to stress that his interlocutors told him in a manner that was mild in form but very firm in content: China was and is a socialist state, and it does not regard

the advantages of capitalism as a question for discussion in relation to the country's future; of course PRC-U.S. ties will develop, but not to such an extent as to call into question the socialist nature of China, with, naturally, specifically Chinese features; Taiwan remains the 'most urgent question' for China, and contrary to Washington's hopes, Beijing does not forget it, and the United States will have to beware of imposing its own policy of recognizing 'two Chinas' on other countries.

"For me, the most important thing in the course of the Chinese-American talks was the confirmation that the PRC's foreign policy remains unshakably independent, and this was demonstrated in practice by the Chinese-American differences on a number of very important international problems. When the state of Chinese-Soviet relations was discussed, it was striking that the PRC is expanding the range of areas in which they are developing successfully. This time border problems were added to the list. This means that 'possibilities' for improving our relations are widening. Of course, Afghanistan and Cambodia remain, but it seems to me that time is on the side of their being less and less of a worry to Beijing and Moscow. The PRC demonstrated to G. Shultz that it is concerned about the growing militarization of Japan and the stepping up of American-South Korean military ties. As if as a counterweight to this, the PRC announced the ending of nuclear tests in the atmosphere (to the annoyance of France) and adhered to the treaty on a Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific. Here is an example of the ideas of Vladivostok already taking material form.

"Lastly, in the course of G. Shultz' talks in Beijing, a more concrete assessment of the prospects for improving Soviet-Chinese relations was heard. We should give serious thought to the reasons for this view.

"The further improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, like the resolution of questions of the security of Asian and Pacific countries, requires time. Perhaps much time. Let us not be in a hurry. Either to make predictions, or to make assessments."

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET INFANTRY DIVISION BEGINS WITHDRAWAL FROM MONGOLIA

Withdrawal Begins

PM101459 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "In the USSR Defense Ministry"]

[Text] In accordance with the decision of the Soviet leadership and by agreement with the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR], the previously announced withdrawal from Mongolia to the Soviet Union of a motorized rifle division and several separate units from the Soviet forces temporarily on MPR territory has begun.

Further Details

LD111906 Moscow TASS in English 1814 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Text] Ulaanbaatar April 11 TASS -- By agreement between the Governments of the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic reported earlier, one motorized infantry division and several individual units of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed on Mongolian territory have begun to be returned home.

The MONTSAME NEWS AGENCY reports that friendly meetings and functions of friendship have taken place in Soviet military units and that they have been attended by leaders of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the government of the country.

The Mongolian people, MONTSAME notes, are greatly thankful to the Soviet soldiers for their fulfillment of their internationalist duty.

Mongolian Reaction

OW111503 Ulaanbaatar MONTSAME in Russian 1408 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 11 Apr (MONTSAME) -- According to the agreement between the Governments of the USSR and the MPR, as it has been announced previously, some of the Soviet troops that were temporarily stationed on MPR territory have started to return home. Friendly meetings and soirees were held in the Soviet military units [word indistinct]. Participating in these were T. Namsray, member of the MPR Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the MPRP Politburo and chairman of the

Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Association; T. Lubsangombo, candidate member of the Central Committee Politburo and deputy chairman of the MPR Council of Ministers; P. Damdin, secretary of the MPRP Central Committee; and other comrades. Artists of the Mongolian People's Army Song and Dance Ensemble as well as those of other artistic collectives performed in the Soviet military units.

Representatives of the Soviet soldiers returning home were warmly received in the Mongolian capital. They laid wreaths at V.I. Lenin memorial, the D. Sukhe-Bator and N. Choybalsan tomb and the memorial to Soviet soldiers on Dzaysan mountain. They also acquainted themselves with the capital's famous places, and visited the state academic opera and ballet theater and central museums.

The Mongolian people will always pay tribute [words indistinct] gratitude for their performing their international duty.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS CITES PRC PREMIER ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

PM071145 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS dispatch: "Zhao Ziyang Statement"]

[Text] Beijing, 4 Apr -- China as a nuclear power has never rejected its responsibility for nuclear disarmament, Zhao Ziyang, acting general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the PRC State Council, said here at a reception in honor of Prime Minister I. Carlsson of Sweden, who is on an official visit here.

According to RENMIN RIBAO, the Chinese leader stressed that the struggle against the arms race and promotion of effective disarmament are an important integral part of Chinese foreign policy. From the first day when it acquired nuclear weapons, Zhao Ziyang noted, the PRC declared that it would never, under any circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor would it ever use them or threaten to use them against nonnuclear countries or nuclear-free zones. China favors a total ban on and destruction of all types of nuclear weapons.

At the same time the Chinese leader declared that the "two superpowers" must bear responsibility for disarmament and be the first to implement large-scale arms reductions.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET DELEGATION VISITS COLOMBIA, DISCUSSES ARMS CONTROL

PA281842 Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 25 Mar 87 p 11a

[Text] The USSR has insisted that political dialogue between the superpowers must be held to save mankind from a catastrophe and "to build a nonviolent, nonnuclear world."

At the same time, it hopes that its proposals to the United States concerning nuclear disarmament will become a reality "to eliminate the sources of enmity and war among the countries of the world."

Grant M. Voskanyan, vice chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, affirmed that at this time the most significant international problems are the struggle for peace and the ban of nuclear armaments.

"The Soviet Government works intensively for peace, and we are insisting on this with the United States so that our disarmament proposals become a reality," said the Soviet official.

Voskanyan heads a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation which arrived yesterday in Bogota for a 5-day visit, at the invitation of the Colombian Congress.

Other members of the delegation are Agadzhan G. Babayev, Oleg I. Lobov, Galina S. Robakova, Liudmila A. Postnikova, secretary, Aleksandr A. Zimakov, adviser, and Eugenio M. Boykov, interpreter.

During their stay in Colombia, the Soviet delegates will meet with President Virgilio Barco and Foreign Minister Julio Londono Paredes. They will also hold conversations with the leaderships of the Senate and Chamber, reporters, and other community representatives.

The delegation will visit the El Cerrojon project and hold meetings with management representatives.

In his first statements the head of the Soviet delegation said: "Political dialogue is extremely important at this time, taking into account the ever-increasing role played by parliamentarians in the struggle to save the human race from a catastrophe, to eradicate sources of hatred and wars, and to build a nonnuclear, nonviolent world."

He emphasized that the USSR build its relations with Colombia and other countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and non-interference in domestic affairs. It favors development of balanced and mutually advantageous cooperation.

After pointing out that the Soviets greatly respect and sympathize with the Colombian people, Voskanyan affirmed that the USSR wants peace in Central America, and praised the mediation of the Contadora Group in the region.

The Soviet official warned that "we will be forced to reinitiate our nuclear tests, but if we detect goodwill on the part of the United States they will be suspended. [no closing quotation mark as published] He added that "we have done all we can to arrive at disarmament agreements but the United States has the last word. We hope that common sense will prevail in the end.

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CSO: 5200/2005

RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

SOVIET PHYSICIANS COMMITTEE MEETS--A session of the Soviet Committee of Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War took place 30 March. The committee examined questions of preparations for the Seventh International Conference of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War Movement, which is to be held in Moscow in May-June. In connection with Academician Ye. I. Chazov's appointment as USSR minister of health, M. I. Kuzin, academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and director of the A. V. Vishnevskiy Institute of Surgery, was elected chairman of the committee. [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 2] /9599

USSR URGES DEMILITARIZED INDIAN OCEAN--New York, 25 Mar (TASS)--TASS correspondent Sergey Baybakov reports: The routine session of the UN special committee on the Indian Ocean is continuing here. In the USSR's view, the Indian Ocean can and must become a peace zone, stated R. M. Timerbayev, the USSR representative. He drew the attention of the committee members to the new Soviet initiatives which are aimed at shifting the issue of the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean out of deadlock. The USSR and other countries of the socialist community support the call from the nonaligned members of the committee to make its work as businesslike as possible. In particular, the Soviet delegation made proposals to implement confidence-building measures applicable to the Indian Ocean. Western delegations are continuing to spin out the committee's work in every way. They are again imposing on the discussion fabricated questions which bear no relation to the real issue. [Excerpts] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2222 GMT 24 Mar 87] /9599

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20 July 1987